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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and lost among the host — as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—The Voice of the Silence

VOL. XXVIII JANUARY 1957 No. 1

"THUS HAVE I HEARD"—

WE ARE TRUSTEES OF OUR POSSESSIONS

The manner of using our money or spending our estate enters so far into the business of every day, and makes so great a part of our common life, that our common life must be much of the same nature as our common way of spending our estate. If reason and religion govern us in this, then reason and religion have got great hold of us; but if humour, pride, and fancy, are the measures of our spending our estate, then humour, pride, and fancy, will have the direction of the greatest part of our life....

If you do not spend your money in doing good to others, you must spend it to the hurt of yourself. You will act like a man, that should refuse to give that as a cordial to a sick friend, though he could not drink it himself without inflaming his blood. For this is the case of superfluous money; if you give it to those that want it, it is a cordial; if you spend it upon yourself in something that you do not want, it only inflames and disorders your mind, and makes you worse than you would be without it.

—WILLIAM LAW: *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life*

Our attitude to our possessions, especially money, greatly colours and shapes our life. In our economic civilization money rolls with a tremendous force.

Generally speaking three attitudes are current. By far the most prevalent attitude is to regard wealth and possessions, whether material possessions or possessions such as fame and power, as ends in themselves. And they are used for personal and selfish purposes, for self-glorification and sense-gratification. This in spite of the positive evidences that these alone do not produce happiness. The *Gita* describes those who are ever in pursuit of wealth and who even stoop to questionable means to obtain it as "deluded" and "demoniac."

Secondly, there are those who believe that economic prosperity cannot go hand in hand with spiritual

progress. And so they take to the begging bowl and call themselves *sannyasis*. But often their thoughts and feelings dwell on riches and *sannyasis* turn *bhikharis* (beggars), a great tax upon the country and a nuisance to society. They are "false pietists of bewildered soul."

Thirdly, there are those who look upon money and possessions as being neither good nor evil in themselves; these are simply objects of trust and avenues of experience. They do not subscribe to the view that poverty is essential for spiritual living; for them asceticism consists in the wise and beneficent *use* of all things, the right *attitude* of mind to wealth and poverty. They are the practitioners of the Divine Discipline or *Raja-Yoga*.

Money can prove a curse and a corruptor of Soul-life if it breeds selfishness or egotism. If used with a righteous motive and a correct method it can prove a blessing. Poverty is as great a curse if it begets vice; if assessed at its proper value as an instrument for the growth of endurance, patience and moral stamina it is a boon and a blessing. It is hard for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven, and yet there is truth in the words of John Donne that "the incorrigible vagabond is farther from all ways of goodness than the corrupt rich man is." On the other hand King Janaka, Ashoka, Marcus Aurelius and other *Raja-Rishis*, Royal Sages and Divine Kings, were spiritually rich and used their vast fortunes wisely because dispassionately. Their attitude to wealth was of Trusteeship, not of ownership. The Great Buddha Himself accepted with approval the gifts made to the Sangha.

A little reflection shows that no one can exercise exclusive and absolute ownership over wealth—of bullion, of knowledge or of virtues. Much of the suffering and misery now prevailing could be alleviated if people would understand and approve the Trustee-Dharma. The beneficiary of the trust is collective humanity. One should not wait to become rich to become a trustee. However small one's stock of money, let him begin *now*. His success does not consist in giving away much, but in using whatever he has in the right way, with discrimination and detachment. Only then will he be a "Conqueror of Wealth."

Money is the emblem of a Power in Nature, personified as the Goddess Laxmi by the Hindus, Amalthæa by the Greeks. The modern world, ignorant of the real nature of that Power, exploits it, and so money instead of healing the wounds corrupts the heart of poor humanity. Those who would be masters of that Power in Nature must learn the correct utility of money, one of the vehicles of that Power. There are wrong forms of charity dealing with mere effects; one must by real personal exertion use money for removing the hidden causes of evil

—false knowledge, personal ambitions to gain fame and power, and the like. But above all one should imitate the sweet and abiding virtue of that Power—Bounty. Enlighten all who sit starving not only for the bread which feeds the body, but know not they are starving for the bread of wisdom. When wealth is used in an unselfish way and intelligently, for the elevation of the race-mind, that Power in Nature produces an alchemical change in the good giver of real gifts. The trustee attracts more wealth for his beneficent work.

One of the four classes of men dear to Krishna is of "those who desire possessions." These are soul-possessions, of which sense-possessions are the dark shadow, ugly and misleading. Soul-possessions grow as they are shared, unlike sense-possessions, which diminish in the sharing. What type of possessions should one yearn for? In the profound treatise *Light on the Path* aspirants are told to "desire possessions above all." It is explained:—

But those possessions must belong to the pure soul only, and be possessed therefore by all pure souls equally, and thus be the especial property of the whole only when united. Hunger for such possessions as can be held by the pure soul, that you may accumulate wealth for that united spirit of life which is your only true self.

Wisdom is one such possession; Compassion is another. From Wisdom, it is said, seven branches of knowledge spring; from the womb of Compassion are born the seven divine virtues. For the right comprehension of Wisdom and the practice of Compassion a third factor is necessary—Good Company. The friendship of those who are like-minded and like-hearted helps us to develop the sense of real unity with all that lives and breathes. This is Real Wealth. It is divested of all selfishness, pride, envy. Desiring such wealth and using it for the good of all, we shall be filled with enjoyment and satisfaction.

SHRAVAKA

THE GENTLE INTERPRETATION OF ECONOMIC FORCES

[**Dr. L. Delgado,** an English educationist and international banker, who has contributed to our pages several articles, here suggests the raising of economics to a higher level than the "enlightened" self-interest which was the highest flight the economist of a few generations ago was prepared to take.—ED.]

Economics deals with that aspect of human behaviour which is influenced by the fact that resources, including time, are limited in relation to various desirable ends, and can be used in several different ways. This is in effect the study of the actions of men confronted with the necessity of choosing how to use scarce means. It is obvious that, for instance, rice that is used as food cannot be used as seed, bricks for building a cinema cannot be used for building a school, steel for war material cannot be used for public works and labour used in any one of these activities cannot serve at the same time for any other use. Time, it will be observed, is also scarce. But have we not tomorrow, next week, next year, and eternity? This is true, but men's needs are pressing and it is today that they have to be fed, clothed and sheltered.

The circumstance that resources are scarce and that human needs are unlimited means that the achievement of one end necessitates the relinquishment of other ends. A choice must therefore be made between the alternatives available. Man will make the choice that will yield him the greatest satisfaction. What constitutes satisfaction is a matter of personal valuation, of which we shall have more to say later.

Never at any time in the world's history has there been a time when such economic considerations were more important than they are today. Never have we been less dependent upon our own unaided efforts to supply our own wants, and never have the possibilities for the exchange of goods and services between individuals and nations been so vast. It is true that the principles of the territorial division and the specialization of labour have been known for thousands of years. A considerable trade took place along the Mediterranean in Greek times and even before, based upon the relative advantage that one area had over another in the production of a particular article and upon the relative skills of certain populations over others. We know that even in those times the whole of the East was skilled in the production of beautiful work in metal, in the manufacture of silks and in the production of spices, which were the objects of wide trading. Banking in India, for example, goes back some 4,000 years, a proof that not only production but also

exchange had reached an advanced stage. With the discoveries during the European Middle Ages of new techniques in navigation (which led to the discovery of new lands and new routes to the East), with the invention of printing, and the development of trading and finance in Genoa, Venice and elsewhere in Italy, the exchange of goods between different areas took place at a slowly accelerating tempo.

But it has been within the last one hundred years that the most rapid progress has taken place, with the discovery and application of new forms of power. These new forms of power not only vastly accelerated production, but also enabled processes to be effected that had hitherto been impossible, *e.g.*, pulling great loads at great speeds over vast distances. Coincident with this industrial revolution there have been enormous advances in medicine, which have kept the vastly increased population in good health, and in agricultural techniques and in animal raising. As all readers of this review know, these new techniques resulted in considerably reduced costs of production and lower prices leading naturally to a great extension of demand for a great variety of goods. It was no longer possible for an individual to be self-sufficient, but this mattered little since there was an enormous variety of goods which he could obtain for his services. The village also could no longer support itself, but, like whole nations, specialized in occupations in which it had a relative advantage and exchanged the produce for the other things needed, which were provided by areas with special advantages in those lines.

These factors are applicable with particular force to the West, but they are clearly visible throughout the East. The particular problem of Asia is the poverty of the inhabitants, due to low productivity *per capita*. It is the endeavour of all the governments in that part of the world to introduce the Western techniques into their countries and so to raise the standard of living of their inhabitants. Already improved methods in agriculture and new machines in industry have improved the lot of millions, so that in the East as in the West men, as individuals, are confronted with the problem of choice to which we referred earlier.

But, as Aristotle saw, there is no essential difference between the management of a household and the management of a State: indeed, the old name for economics is political economy. Although Adam Smith asserted—not without reason, many think—that that State is the best which interferes least with its people, the aims of government have gradually widened to affect mankind directly in a multitude of ways. We are all now obliged to attend school until a given age even though we might be able to increase

the family income earlier by going down a mine. The State limits the number of hours we are allowed to work in a day and the types of occupation that shall be undertaken by women or children, and a watchful eye is kept on the kind of work we do. More than this, in many countries large slices of our income are taken away from us as a matter of social policy, say to equalize incomes or to prevent inflation. We have here reached a stage in which the borders of economics, politics and ethics impinge upon one another.

What considerations are to prevail? Perhaps a study of the past will be a guide for the future. During the nineteenth century, when the West was developing rapidly in the industrial field, there was little room for ethical considerations. Labour, including the *entrepreneur* himself, was exploited to the utmost, irrespective of age, sex or class. If Sunday was kept as a day of rest, it was only because it provided a convenient pause during which labour recouped its forces. It was at this time and in this industrial climate that economics made its great strides. It was moving along scientific lines, and its exponents were curiously obsessed with the finality of the laws they discovered (which was not at all a scientific attitude).

But the economists of this time—the Classical School—were not the inhuman monsters that they were sometimes made out to be. Great material progress was made during the industrial revolution. It was believed that, if existing government regulations were removed, progress would be even more striking (and much the same thing is being said today). In those days, it should be remembered, governments were inefficient and corrupt, so that the critics might well have been right. It was held that government intervention to remedy abuses was unnecessary because competition was assumed to be perfect and the mobility of labour great. If wages and conditions were unsatisfactory, the workers would go elsewhere, and employers would be forced to improve conditions in order to retain their labourers. But, of course, equality of contracting power does not mean equality of bargaining power. We now know that the conditions necessary for automatic adjustment did not exist.

Nevertheless, the belief in *laissez-faire* was almost universal. In the bustle of the market place and comforted by the thought, first expressed by Adam Smith, that the self-interest of each individual worked out for the highest good of all, men felt no need to import ethical considerations from outside: economics was a self-sufficing science. The Christian Church itself seems to have been taken by surprise by the Industrial Revolution, and had not organized itself to meet the new problems that now

presented themselves.

The great error of the Classical Economists lay in basing their doctrines on a few general principles which they assumed to be universal. Such a system could not be valid, because man's nature was not immutable but changed with changes in contemporary institutions. The reaction to classical thought took the form of Socialism, of which the kindest variety was that of Robert Owen and the most violent that of Karl Marx.

The economists that followed those of the Classical School cast doubts on some of the doctrines held, particularly on the theory of value. The marginal utility theory of value, which replaced the labour cost theory, opened the way to the modern analysis of economic problems. The interdependence of economic phenomena has been realized, and the result has been the emergence of "equilibrium analysis." The relation of given factors to one another changes in the same way as balls moving freely in a bowl change relatively in position to one another. The nature of "cost" has changed, the true explanation of which is not regarded as money costs but as displacement costs, *i.e.*, the true cost of a war is the cost measured not in terms of money but of all the alternatives foregone, such as schools, roads, houses, etc.

This modern conception of the subject no longer presupposes that economics is self-sufficing or self-correcting, in an automatic way, of errors to which it might give rise. Economics is a strictly impersonal science. Whatever political opinions an economist may hold, these should in no way colour his analysis of economic problems, in the same way as a chemist is not swayed by his political faith in the experiments he undertakes. It was precisely in confusing analysis and opinions that lay the error of those who followed the Classical economists. Of course, an economist can, by his training and education, give a valuable opinion on the merits of given aims, but he does so as a citizen or a philosopher, not as an economist. He can say how scarce means can be used most efficiently to attain given ends or how the achievement of certain aims will affect the disposition of scarce means, but he cannot pronounce on the desirability of the ends.

As means are always scarce relatively to ends, it follows that economic laws are true in all circumstances: they are applicable equally to all forms of government (*e.g.*, capital has not disappeared in the U.S.S.R.: its role is played by the State), to all religious creeds, to all races, whatever their colour or language, to saints and sinners, to those of high estate and to those of low. None can escape their implication; even the hermit, by retiring from this world, reduces the demand for seats at the opera and therefore

the earnings of opera singers.

Since economics is not self-correcting, the mental influences governing the choices made are of the utmost importance. We have said that in deciding how to choose between the possible uses of scarce resources man will choose that which will give him the greatest satisfaction. This will be a personal valuation, varying with each individual, and should remain so; it should not be imposed from above. But it is very important that the choice should be a good one. It must be admitted that at present our sense of values is not of a very high order, and is in need of much education. Many important decisions are carried into effect by politicians, who have the last word in matters affecting the community. These decisions are often clouded by considerations of prestige, national honour, patriotism, and so on, that may run counter to economic requirements and often be in direct opposition to ethical values.

The mental influences involved in our economic behaviour must be reorientated from their present materialism to conform with far higher principles than at present. Today public opinion approves of our making the greatest monetary gain possible in our commercial transactions; we would be deemed naive and downright foolish if, for instance, we refrained from selling fruit or vegetables (or anything else) at the highest price the market would bear in a time of scarcity. Yet this is a sin, for we are taking advantage of the distress of our fellow beings. Are we not all brothers, and should we not do to others as we would be done by? If, as most people believe, this life is but a preparation for the next, how can we explain the selfish motives guiding the choices we make in our economic problems? It may well be —indeed it is very probable—that the scarcity of resources has been deliberately created by the Deity in order to form our character.

In a truly noble society shorn of its false values, we would wish to revalue our scale of occupational rewards. We may come to the conclusion that there is far too great a difference between the earnings of a cinema star and those of, say, a tiller of the soil. This differential exists at present because there is great popular demand for skills in entertainment that, however intellectually poor, are yet comparatively rare, while farm workers are not nearly so scarce. When demand is great and supply restricted, the price will always be high. The remedy in this particular case is again to educate public opinion towards more æsthetic pleasures.

It might be argued that our aim could be achieved more effectively by reducing our wants; it was a Greek philosopher who remarked that wealth did not consist in our store of material things but in the

paucity of our wants. This, however, is not so. It is right that we should have a high standard of life, for in this way far more people can exist with a fuller life than could ever be possible in a primitive society; machines take over brutalizing work and mankind has less and less heavy work and more and more leisure to put to good use.

We have posed the problem. How are we to ennoble our economic behaviour? In this vast field covering the whole of mankind, it is obvious that the method chosen must be a universal one. A new set of values must be instilled into mankind. These new principles, to be successful, must spring from the heart and must not be imposed upon individuals by force. A basis for such moral and spiritual values was enunciated by Christ in His Sermon on the Mount. These ethical directives are not contingent upon any given form of ritual or ceremony or limited to a priestly caste, but are applicable to, and can be accepted by, noble men and women everywhere. The principles are of universal application, but they are very difficult indeed to put into practice. Some progress has been made in the two thousand years that have elapsed since they were enunciated, and near-perfection has been attained by some rare individuals—Gandhi is one example and Albert Schweitzer another—but most of the precepts are yet to be instilled not only into individuals but into governments. It is folly to think that Christian principles motivate the actions of so-called Christian countries or that India is governed in her actions by the teaching of Gandhi. But, if we value our present life for its influence on the next, we must adopt a gentler approach to the economic problems arising from the circumstance that resources are limited relatively to wants. When we adopt this approach, the suspicions and misunderstandings that bedevil relations between classes, employers and employed, between individuals and between nations will completely disappear. In any case, the elevation of our principles is good for its own sake, apart from any consideration of our welfare in the next world; it is the noblest test of all not to consider any reward for ourselves.

L. Delgado

For I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that "virtue" is not given by money, but that from "virtue" comes money and every other good of man, public as well as private.

—Socrates in Plato's *Apology*

HUMANITY AND THE CRIMINAL

[**Mr, Derrick Sington** entered the notorious Belsen Concentration Camp as Commander of the first British Unit in April 1945. He is the author of *The Goebbels Experiment* and *Malayan Perspectives*. He makes out here a strong case for enlightened treatment of the criminal. As Sir Maurice Gwyer, then Chief Justice of India, declared at the First All-India Penal Reform Conference in February 1940, while the community has a right to protect itself against the criminal, the latter is one of its own members. As such he too is entitled to protection against society, which would continue to create criminals as well as to punish them until it had accepted in full "the faith, often shaken but never shattered, in the common humanity of us all." This faith needs to be quickened, not only in prison officials of the old school, with the readjustment of whose attitude Mr. Sington deals here, but also in members of the public, on whom the rehabilitated criminal must depend for a chance to make good after his release.—ED.]

The present age aspires, perhaps more than any earlier one, to solve the problems of happiness and the good life by international, inter-racial and social action. More is written and talked about such endeavours than ever before. One field of activity through which the total content of humanity in a society can be solidly increased is, however, widely neglected: namely, men's attitudes towards those who offend against legally enforced standards, or—to use the loaded word—criminals. In essence all humane and constructive relations depend on the attempt to understand others—their needs, their weaknesses, their strength, what they have to offer. This attempt when it is made under the most difficult conditions is also made at the highest level. In the effort to comprehend and to cure, man as a social animal is at his best. The hardest circumstance under which to deploy such an effort is when faced by the problem of the delinquent, the temporary or permanent spiritual outlaw of society.

The delinquent represents, of course, what the ordinary "good citizen" is narrowly separated from being—perhaps by an accident of birth or upbringing; perhaps by a difference of brain-cell structure; perhaps only by luck in escaping detection. This is what makes attitudes in this field of social relations such a crucial test of honesty, sympathy and humanity. The field is also a fine one for the creative energies. What could be more satisfying than to re-establish or rehabilitate a human being with all his incalculable potentialities?

The more advanced communities of the world are today poised between two attitudes towards criminals and crime. The first is based on old ideas of harshness, and even brutality, as a supposed deterrent, as an expression of

society's disapprobation of crime and—one must add—as an outlet for its emotional craving for vengeance; the second rests on concepts partly derived from the newer sciences of sociology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis. It holds that crime is most often the result of something that "has gone wrong" in the evolution of the human being or is the symptom of some inherited structural flaw, difficult to detect in the present state of medical knowledge. This second school of thought and action finds it rational to consider the criminal—and what may be wrong with him—rather than the crime. It regards deprivation of liberty alone as an adequate mark of society's disapproval of the criminal, and the infliction of extra harshness as not only unnecessary but also a socially self-defeating policy which prevents regeneration by further hardening and deforming the offender. The corollary, for this second school of thought, is that criminals should be treated and rehabilitated rather than hurt and punished—and this for the sake as much of society as of the individual offender. For a reclaimed offender can be re-assimilated and can make his contribution to the community instead of remaining a charge on it, as he is when in prison or preying on his fellow men.

The second school of thought is making appreciable headway in the world today, thanks to the work of a number of brilliant, humanitarian penologists, particularly in the United States and in certain countries of Europe. Governments, officials and legislators in many countries of the world already pay considerable heed to the ideas of these men. But the other school of thought—the "make punishment terrible" school—dies hard and is still strongly entrenched in the penal and prison systems of all nations. The result of this situation is a series of the most bizarre contrasts between, for instance, those intimidating granite fortresses, the London prisons, and the beautiful sanatorium-like bungalows in the pine woods which are Sweden's latest institutions for young offenders; between the gruesome horror of the electrocution sheds of the United States and the scaffolds of France and Spain on the one hand and the peaceful, painstaking rehabilitation and eventual release of even the most brutal murderers in Holland and Denmark; between the vast, dehumanizing penitentiaries of some States of the U.S.A., with their labyrinths of cages like human zoos, and, on the other hand, the small prisons made of country houses with only 50 or 100 inmates, in pleasant surroundings, in Scandinavia.

What are the main features which penal reformers today consider essential for further real progress towards the elimination of crime? First of all, the abolition of those relics of an earlier penal

practice based on undiluted violence against the person of the offender—the death penalty and corporal punishment. Capital punishment has clearly failed as a deterrent. The fact that retention countries employ it only half-heartedly shows that they have lost faith in its efficacy for this purpose; and in countries that have done away with it there has been no sign that its abolition has led to an increase in crime. The main charge against capital punishment is, however, that wherever it is used it perpetuates the idea of hurting and harming the criminal. It is this principle which, carried out through prison officers and prison regimes, brutalizes offenders and confirms them in the way of crime. (One might also add that it brutalizes the prison officers themselves.) The idea of doing physical violence to the criminal is, in short, one great enemy of rehabilitation and regeneration.

But even when the idea of physical violence has been abandoned, as it has been—at least ostensibly—in the prison systems of many countries, there remains the spiritual violence of brutal surroundings and contemptuous and bullying attitudes of prison officers. All such things have incalculable effects in distorting distorted personalities still further, in turning the offender into the confirmed enemy of society, into the recidivist or "repeater." Clearly this is above all a problem of relations between prison staff and prison inmates. Until and unless the former see their task as one of human regeneration rather than one of intimidation and harassment, the decisive step in penal reform has not been taken.

One quite simple principle of material planning must, however, be adopted if anything like a human, regenerative relationship between prison officers and prison inmates is to be created: prisons or institutions must be reasonably small. In the vast penitentiaries so common in the U.S.A. (that in Jackson, Michigan, was the most notorious example), even in Wandsworth or Pentonville in Britain (each with over 1,000 inmates) all that a relatively small staff can do is to act as watch-dogs for security. A machine-like coerciveness is bound to prevail. In contrast the newer youth institutions of Sweden contain no more than about 60 inmates with a staff of 40 or 50. This makes it possible for each officer—whether doctor, warder, technical assistant or matron—to take a personal interest in two or three of the delinquents, to get to know something about each one, to develop personal relationships with them. The prison officers do not need to be psychiatrists or trained psychotherapists to do this, though a certain "rough-and-ready" briefing by the prison doctor if he is a psychiatrist is an obvious advantage and is carried out in Sweden. An obvious corollary of such a regenerative role of the

prison or institution staff is the holding of regular staff conferences, presided over by the Governor, to discuss the personal problems and attitudes of individual inmates, not in terms of punishment but in terms of understanding and helping.

It would, of course, be utterly unrealistic to suggest that prison warders, as they have hitherto been trained in most countries (merely to subdue and "keep in order"), are capable immediately of undertaking such work, which calls for much patience, insight and sympathy. But it is precisely the effort to re-train prison officers for this constructive role which is going on in some adventurous countries and meeting with success. The new Training School for Prison Staff at the Hague, for example, provides a three-week course for all guards and warders, which is quite separate from ordinary "security" training. Here the officers are instructed by psychiatrists and psychologists, and they learn to think out and discuss the fundamental problems associated with crime and punishment. The training in how to lock a cell door is supplemented by discussion on why and whether it is necessary to do so. Lectures are given on penal-reform measures and their why and wherefore. Awkward situations with someone acting a "difficult" prisoner are played out by warders taking part in the courses—with a trained psychologist discussing the wisdom or unwisdom of each trainee's line of action in dealing with the problem. Even lectures and discussions on music and painting take place as part of these courses, the assumption being that quickened sympathy and a heightened sensibility are assets to prison personnel in what should be an important part of their task, namely the regeneration of submerged and distorted fellow human beings.

These lines of approach—small, ungloomy prisons and a rehabilitative prison staff—are two fundamentals of penological progress. Another is the proper grouping and classification of delinquents so that first offenders do not associate with and become influenced by confirmed and repeated offenders, and so that abnormal or psychopathic personalities—with all their disturbing effects—are not mixed up with normal people. Many more first offenders could with advantage be placed on probation and never committed to prison than are so treated today; but headway has at least been made in many countries with the separation of such "safe" delinquents (however serious their offence) and their placement in open camps with good facilities for education, industrial training and recreation. Thus the unnecessary loss of self-respect through incarceration behind high walls and locked gateways is avoided in the case of many offenders. In Sweden as many as 30% of all persons being punished are in such open camps; in

Britain the figure is 10%.

But there remains the great and formidable problem of the so-called hardened offenders and of the mentally abnormal (though not legally insane) criminals. To a very great extent these recognized two categories overlap; for it is recognized more and more by penologists that a great deal of crime is the result of mental abnormality and that only by trying to discover the causes why a criminal's mind has become warped, and by "mental therapy" to heal him, is his regeneration possible. Often this entails going deep into a person's past history in which serious strains, resulting sometimes from maltreatment as a child, are discovered. The curative process can demand individual psychoanalysis or, in some cases, what is known as group psychotherapy. In the latter form of treatment, volunteer groups of delinquents under the leadership of a therapist (who must be a person of infinite tact and self-effacement) are brought to discuss their own and one another's problems and grievances together so that, in fact, they gradually criticize and, as it were, unravel each other. This method of treatment has met with success in restoring confirmed offenders to normality and stability in some parts of the United States, in Sweden, in Holland and in Britain. Probably the most remarkable of all centres of psychiatric treatment of dangerous offenders in the world today is in Utrecht, Holland, where 80 abnormal offenders (several of them murderers) are receiving intensive psychotherapy in a virtually open clinic, with 30 of them doing ordinary jobs in factories and offices in the town. The system of home leave for inmates every few months —so as to maintain links with society—is in operation at the Utrecht centre as it is in all Swedish prisons. It seems certain that the curative treatment of criminals by psychotherapy, which is still in its infancy even in penologically advanced nations, ought to be, and is destined to be, steadily expanded.

It is often said that all these new and revolutionary methods of dealing with criminals are an unwarranted development because they involve the spending of great sums by society on an "undeserving" sector of the population. Is this really so? A great Dutch penal reformer once told me that a criminal with a 30-year record of crime had just been sent to him for psychiatric treatment. "That man," said my friend, "has cost society £10,000 simply to house him in prison during his career of crime. If I could receive such offenders for treatment in my clinic after their first offence I could cure and regenerate most of them within three years at a cost of £2. 10*s*. a day, or £1,600." The curative, humane approach may also be the economical one in the long run.

DERRICK SINGTON

INDIAN CULTURE IN INDONESIA

[**Mr. H. I. S. Kanwar** was brought up and educated in Singapore and Malaya; he has served as a Commissioned Officer in the Indian Armed Forces and is now stationed in New Delhi. His study of Indian culture in Indonesia complements interestingly Dr. B. Ch. Chhabra's lecture delivered at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, on July 16th, 1953, on the "Eastward Expansion of Aryan Culture," which appeared in our November 1953 issue and as the Institute's Reprint No. 12.—ED.]

One of the earliest references to Indonesia is found in the *Ramayana*, which mentions Suvarnadvipa, or the Isle of Gold (meaning wealth-producing land), and Javadvipa thus: "With all your efforts reach Yavadvipa, adorned with seven kingdoms, the island of gold and silver, rich with mines of gold."

The writings of Ptolemy, the ancient Alexandrian geographer and astronomer, reveal that there were Indian colonists and traders not only in Burma and Malaya but also in Indonesia and Indochina. Ptolemy mentions the island of Iabidiu (the Prakrit form of the Sanskrit name *Javadvipa*, modern Java) thus: "Iabidiu, which means the isle of barley, is said to be of extraordinary fertility and produces gold in abundance."

In spite of the fact that the Hindu *shastras* were believed to forbid emigration, Indian traders ventured across the Bay of Bengal to ply their trade in gold, ivory, rhinoceros horn, sloes and camphor. Stories of the fabulous wealth of Indonesia soon spread in India, creating great interest. Indian scholars familiar with Sanskrit accompanied the traders to study the land in all its aspects. Then a strange thing happened; the inhabitants appreciated the doctrines of these scholars so much that by gradual stages they found themselves converted to Hinduism and Buddhism.

How did this happen? Some historians relate that Indonesia received wave after wave of immigrants from the mainland of Asia.

The first distinct wave occurred around 3,000 B.C., when the immigrants appear to have come from Yunan in South China and, spreading south, to have branched off into two streams, one moving to India along its eastern coast and the other through Burma and Malaya and finally to Indonesia and the Moluccas. The second distinct wave was about 300 B.C., when the adventurers came down the same route, this time fanning out as far as New Guinea, where to this day Indonesian culture flourishes. With the lapse of time, the culture of the two waves fused together into Indonesian civilization, which existed until the impact of Hindu civilization transformed it.

Similarly, during the first thousand years of this era, there were four or five waves of colonization by Indian adventurers all over the East. Though scattered, their colonies were "mainly on strategic points and on trade routes." Sailing down the west coast of Malaya, they reached Singhapura the "Lion-City," Sumatra and Java.

That Indonesia was a highly civilized and flourishing state has been confirmed in both Indian and Chinese documents, which mention that Davavarman, a king of Java, sent an ambassador to China in 132 A.D., and in return received a golden seal and a violet ribbon from the then Chinese Emperor. An earlier Chinese record, dated about 20 A.D., includes a description of Indonesia, referred to by the Chinese chronicler as "Je-tio." Another document, the *Niddesa*, dated about the late second century, mentions the places which a navigator might visit along the east coast of the Bay of Bengal, and, when dealing with Java and Sumatra, mentions places with strange designations such as "Sankupantha" (which could be climbed only with the aid of spikes), "Chhatrapantha" (where umbrellas were to be used as parachutes for descending) and "Sakunapantha" (to which birds served as guides).

The above facts are confirmed in the writings of that famous Chinese traveller, Fa-Hien, who visited Java in 414 A.D. and recorded that the inhabitants were either Brahmins or pagans, and that there were even a few Buddhists. In western Java are several Sanskrit inscriptions dating back to the third and fourth centuries. One refers to the Hindu king Purnavarman, ruler of the state of Tarumanagara in western Java, comparing his footprints with those of Vishnu, and another to the digging of the Gomati and Chandrabhaga canals. There also exist in western Java ancient shrines dedicated to Brahmanical gods. The inscriptions are said to be in the script called the Pallava Grantha.

In the fourth century, when the Shrivijaya Empire came to exist, several Indian scholars visited Indonesia. A most notable visitor was Shrijnan Dipankar, who met there Acharya Chandra Kirti, the eminent Buddhist scholar, and declared Shrivijaya the headquarters of Buddhism in the East. Prince Gunavarman, another eminent Buddhist scholar and missionary, ventured from his native Kashmir in 420 A.D. to spread his gospel in Indonesia. His activities were mainly confined to Sumatra, owing to which Buddhism flourished there in a purer form. In 423 A.D., Gunavarman spent some time in Java *en route* to China. The teachings of these Indian scholars were an important influence in the emerging of Buddhism as the predominant faith in Indonesia by the sixth century, and gave rise to a more refined culture.

Right up to about 1400 A.D., for

almost a thousand years, Buddhism and Brahmanism flourished side by side.

Hinduism and Buddhism acting as unifying forces, the power of Indonesia grew rapidly. With the conversion of all the princes, their petty squabbles disappeared. From this emerged the mighty Shrivijaya Empire which flourished for about seven hundred years. A great naval power based on trade and commerce, it reached its peak in the eleventh century, then holding sway over Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Celebes, Malaya, the Philippines, part of Indochina, Formosa, Ceylon and south-eastern India. It was a home of culture and learning, where Chinese scholars on their way to India stayed for considerable periods, collecting Buddhist manuscripts and studying Buddhist philosophy, and thus acquiring Buddhist knowledge prior to landing in India. The revenues of some villages in Bihar were devoted to the support of a Shrivijaya house in the Buddhist University of Nalanda.

In the second half of the fourteenth century, Java completely conquered the Sailendra Empire of Shrivijaya, later becoming the seat of the Hindu Empire of Majapahit, which had risen in east Java to spread over Indonesia. During the rise of the Majapahit, there were internal conflicts amongst the various potentates, the weaker ones being eliminated, which in a way aided the unification of Indonesia. There was rapid expansion of trade, commerce and naval power, so much so that many neighbouring lands, including Thailand, came under its sway. The Majapahit Empire had a highly centralized and efficient form of government, which evolved excellent systems of taxation, customs, tolls and revenue. There were colonial, commerce, public-welfare, health, interior and war departments, and a supreme court with two presiding judges and seven other judges. Trade was mainly with India and China and its colonies. This empire lasted nearly two hundred years, attaining its peak from 1355 to 1380. Soon after, decay set in following the famine of 1426, and the empire vanished in the same way as its predecessor, its doom being hurried on by the ever-growing force of Islam in the last quarter of the fifteenth century.

When the Hindu colonists and Buddhist missionaries set foot in Indonesia to introduce Indian culture they found a flourishing Indonesian culture, and, when the two cultures met, their fusion resulted in a new culture comprising the best of both. As a consequence, the art of Indonesia is a mixture of Hindu-Buddhist and Hindu-Javanese arts, which have been used to express the ideas deeply rooted in the native ancestor cult. It was but inevitable that, initially, art in Indonesia should be predominantly Indian in character, but later it

gradually adapted itself to native ideals.

Several ancient monuments and inscriptions and traditions existing in Indonesia, especially in Java, are a living evidence of the influence of Indian culture. A Malay inscription, dated 684 A.D., of a Mahayana Buddhist ruler of Shrivijaya named Jayanasa, speaks of the Vajrayana school of thought developed in Bengal in the mid-seventh century, whose first preacher was Saraha, once head of the Nalanda University. It is the earliest evidence of Mahayana Buddhism in Indonesia. Since Anangavajra, a son of Gopala, the founder of the Pala dynasty of Bengal, appears to have been a contemporary of the Sumatran Jayanasa, it is indeed amazing that the new doctrine should almost simultaneously become prominent at places so far apart.

There is the interesting Janggal inscription in central Java, dated 760 A.D., recording the consecration of the Maharishi Agastya. From a later inscription in Javanese, dated 863 A.D., mentioning Agastya's descendants as having settled there, it appears that the Maharishi may have ventured across the Bay of Bengal in the early Indian colonization period.

At Kalasan, also in central Java, exists an inscription, dated 778 A.D., said to be in a North Indian script, recording the erection of a temple of the Mahayana goddess Tara. Since a similar script was in vogue in far-off Nalanda about the ninth century, there is evidence to show that this worship could have come only from the Palas of Bengal, a fact supported by another inscription in the same script at Kelurak, which refers to the Rajaguru's arrival from Gudidvipa (the old name for Bengal) to "purify with the holy dust of his feet" the Sailendra king of central Java. Noted archæologists, taking into consideration inscriptions of the same period in Java and Bengal, opine that the Sailendra king wedded the daughter of the Bengal king Dharampala, named Tara, who was eventually influential in having the temple of Tara built at Kalasan. All this suggests that Shrivijaya received Mahayana Buddhism from Bengal.

The oldest monuments of Java are the Hindu temples in the Dieng Plateau, dating back to the beginning of the eighth or even the late seventh century. The Mahayana Buddha Temple of Borobudur is a marvel not only of Indo-Javanese but also of temple architecture. The entire life of Buddha is depicted in rare sculptures and reliefs for the benefit of the worshippers, who were mostly illiterate. The temple covers a whole hill carved into a *stupa*, its walls adorned with exquisite bas-reliefs relating the Mahayana legends, which are so planned that as one moves from the lower to the upper storeys there is a feeling of rising to higher spiritual levels.

In the ninth century one finds the grand Brahmanical temple of Prambanan with its wonderful stone reliefs from the *Ramayana* legends, a tradition carried down to the thirteenth century, as shown by the Panataran group of temples in east Java representing similar *Ramayana* scenes, though in the Javanese shadow-figure (*wayang*) style. The *Mahabharata* stories, with the Krishna legends, also appeared in sculptured figures, puppets and shadow-plays based on the Javanese versions which inspire the Indonesians even today, after their conversion to Islam. In the second half of the ninth century, Hinduism again became the predominating faith in central Java; but Buddhism and it continued side by side. During the last centuries of the Hindu-Javanese period, when the mystical and magical ideas of the *Tantras* began to influence Buddhism as well as Hinduism, strong tendencies towards a syncretism of the two religions made themselves evident.

The art, language, literature and political and social institutions of Java bear an unmistakable impress of Indian ideas to this day. The spirit of Javanese poetry, drama, music and dancing is close to the Indian, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* having played a very important part in the development of these fine arts. The epics of the Hindus as well as many of their Puranas are still available in Javanese versions. Some of the scientific and medical texts of India are among the literary remains of ancient Java. Shiva was a popular deity of the ancient Javanese; as was also Shakti or Devi. Images of Ganesha and of Kartikeya have been unearthed in Java. Vishnu with his carrier Garuda is represented in the sculptures found there.

The influence of Borneo is attested by several Sanskrit inscriptions of the fifth century, acknowledging gifts of gold and cows to Brahmins, who were an important element of the population there. Brahmanical rites and ceremonies found great favour at the court. Sandstone images unearthed in Borneo include those of Hindu gods—Shiva, Ganesha, Nandi, Agastya, Brahma and Mahakali. A few are of Buddhist figures. Mention may also be made of the seven gold figures of the Buddha and several Bodhisattvas recently discovered in West Borneo. Their exquisite style and workmanship are characteristically Indian.

The greatest living monument to the influence of Indian culture is the wonder isle of Bali. From the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, when Islam spread over Sumatra and Java,

its march halted on the shores of Bali. Instead of erecting mosques to Mohammed, the people continued to build elaborate stone and brick temples to their Hindu gods—and still do.

There is a large number of shrines to Shiva, Vishnu and Brahma in Bali.

In Indonesia, the Indian immigrants are still known as "Orang Kaling," a survival of the name Kalinga, by which the people of Orissa were known. In the third century, the Kalingas and the Andhras of Orissa and Vengi laid the foundation of Indianized states in these islands. The expansive movement of Indian culture had its heyday in Java, the Hindu basis of whose culture has been a marvel of India's cultural colonization. It was a prince of Kalinga who inaugurated this movement by founding a Hindu state in Java in the first century. Later there came into existence another Hindu kingdom in central Java, which was called Ho-Ling or Kalinga, after the name of the original homeland of the colonists. The Sailendra dynasty, which became so famous in south-east Asia, is believed to have come originally from Orissa, which then was a stronghold of Buddhism despite the ruling dynasty being Brahmanical.

One of the greatest tributes to the influence of Indian culture and art in Indonesia is paid by Havell in his book *The Ideals of Indian Art*:—

Indian art in Java has a character of its own which distinguishes it from that of the continent from whence it came. There runs through both the same strain of deep serenity, but in the divine ideal of Java we lose the austere feeling which characterizes the Hindu sculpture of Elephanta and Mamallapuram. There is more of human contentment and joy in Indo-Javanese Art, an expression of that peaceful security which Indian colonists enjoyed in their happy island home, after the centuries of storm and struggle which their forefathers had experienced on the mainland.

H. I. S. KANWAR

The mass of cumulative evidence, recently reinforced, and the conclusive opinions furnished by many scholars, all go to prove that India was the *Alma Mater* of the civilization, arts and sciences of all other nations and even of all the great religions of antiquity. It is no idle fancy of a few who distort facts in order to glorify their country, but the corroborated evidence of countless scholars that India was the birth-place of civilization and culture, in fact the cradle of the human race. And when we say "India" we do not mean the India of our modern days but that of the archaic, prehistoric period, when countries which subsequently came to be known by other names were all called India. In those ancient times an unbroken continent—later destroyed by a geological upheaval—included not only Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Annam, the Malay Peninsula and Malay Archipelago, which territories Dr. Chhabra mentions in his paper as comprising Greater India, but what we now call Iran on the one hand, and Tibet, Mongolia, Great Tartary and even far-away Tasmania on the other, were considered by the ancients as India and were designated as Upper, Lower and Western India.

—*I.I.C. Reprint No. 12*, Preface, p. 1

SOME PACIFIST PIONEERING IN AMERICA

[**Reginald Reynolds,** author of *White Sahibs in India* and *Beware of Africans*, completes his study on pacifists begun in our September number.—Ed.]

When writing recently on the subject "What Are Pacifists Doing?" I rashly offered, since I was then on my way to America, to follow up what was mainly a critical statement on pacifism in Great Britain with some account of pacifist action in the United States. After four and a half months of travelling in the States I find that my knowledge is, in fact, restricted to a limited study of the work of the American Friends Service Committee, but that alone seems to justify some reflections.

On the face of it the reader might imagine that I had moved only among Quakers. In fact, however, the A.F.S.C., which operates on a scale vastly greater than any pacifist organization in Britain, does not confine its work to Quakers and Quakerism. It uses people of all denominations or none. It works among non-Quakers principally, and has a relationship with non-pacifists unparalleled by any other pacifist organization that I know. Its objectives are broadly Christian, pacifist and humanitarian, ranging from the work of relief and rehabilitation to that with which I was directly concerned this summer—social, political and spiritual education.

In discussing the work of the American Friends Service Committee I have no wish to suggest that the work of other pacifist organizations in America is unimportant. The Christian pacifists have long been building up, in the American Fellowship of Reconciliation, an organization generally considered by outsiders to be more radical and more realistic than its counterpart in Great Britain—and both radicalism and realism might be expected of any group in which the able mind of A. J. Muste has long played such a distinguished part.

The War Resisters League—a secular body, comparable to the Peace Pledge Union in Britain—has also had able leaders, none more so than its brilliant Secretary today, Bayard Rustin. But I saw no evidence that either of these organizations had found the means to break new ground. My impression—which may have been superficial—was that they have the same tendency so noticeable in the F.O.R. and P.P.U. in Britain: the tendency to move in a circle. This criticism applies even more to many smaller groups and especially to many "Intentional Communities" of the Bruderhof type.

The best idea becomes socially sterile when it circulates only within a closed cult. No pacifist wants that sterility, but few have found the means of breaking through. What I saw of A.F.S.C. work in America seemed important to me because it *did* break through and because its methods were essentially experimental and subject to continual re-evaluation.

I have attended many Summer Schools in Britain—Socialist Summer Schools run by the Independent Labour Party and attended by its devotees; Quaker Summer Schools attended by Quakers; Pacifist Summer Schools attended, mainly at least, by pacifists. One of the few exceptions was an F.O.R. Summer School in 1954 where many of the students—perhaps a majority—were *not* pacifists; but this I noted as an exception to the general rule, with the hope that the British Fellowship of Reconciliation was planning its future on these lines. It was not until I went to America this summer that I was able to participate in a whole programme of this kind in which for months I was able to meet people of very different opinions from my own on the basis of a common search for truth.

What we should call a Summer School is called an "Institute" by the American Friends Service Committee. Most Institutes last a week and I noted four distinct types: (1) The type intended for adults of all ages; (2) the "Family Institute," to which whole families are invited to come, provision being made for the entertainment and even for the education—according to their capacity—of the children; (3) the Institute for college students and (4) the Institute for "teenagers." The first type is possible on a non-residential basis and can be held in a city, attended by people unable to attend a residential school. This appears to be the only advantage of the non-residential type, which loses much by the absence of a full and complete social life. The second, third and fourth types were, in my experience, always held at some conference centre—perhaps a camp away in the country—or at a residential college or university.

Other activities of the A.F.S.C. include seminars (one, at which I was present for a week, lasted for a month altogether) and work camps for "teenagers" and older people. The two "teenage" work camps where I spent some time each lasted six weeks. None of the activities I have listed so far are unknown in other countries, though the kind of people they attracted and the way the essential task was tackled gave me cause for much reflection. There were, however, other forms of activity which have, so far as I am aware, no counterpart in any other country. Among these were projects which enabled college students to do valuable voluntary work in

public institutions, living a communal group life and sharing their ideas and problems. There was a similar form of project for students spending the long vacation in individual jobs. It is valuable for them to learn something of other people's work and their lives, but there is nothing new in the idea of manual (and even "menial") work for American students in vacation time. What is new here is the fact that the A.F.S.C. establishes centres where these student-workers live and are able, under the guidance of a good Warden, to get something more than dollars out of the experience—an inter-racial community life and some organized talks and discussions.

So far I have said nothing that sounds very revolutionary. From such structures one could produce anything or nothing. All depends upon two questions: Who takes part in these projects? and What leadership is offered them? I do not regard the A.F.S.C. as a perfect organization. (Indeed, its human fallibility, added to my own, often made my journeys quite terrifying experiences, and it was a source of wonder to me that I did, in fact, always arrive where I was expected.) But I learned more from A.F.S.C. techniques, and from the very able people engaged for the work, than I have learned from anybody or anything (on the subject of pacifist education) since I studied the methods of Gandhiji in India.

First, then, the participants. I was astonished at the heavy non-Quaker, non-pacifist majorities I found *at the outset* in the Institutes for younger people. How they were induced to come at all, I do not know; but there they were. Most of the bungling pacifists I know would have wrecked the whole show, confronted with such a golden temptation, but this brings me to the most vital point: treatment. If I cannot explain how the A.F.S.C. manages to collect non-pacifist boys and girls, I can, at least, try to explain what it does with them.

There is, to begin with (and to end with for that matter) absolutely no effort in the Institutes to "plug" pacifism. The basic assumption is simply that everyone wants to know truth from falsehood and to have some clue to right action in personal and social decisions. The "faculty" members or "resource people" are there to help this search by supplying information, stimulating discussion and encouraging the participants to look at human problems not merely as intellectual laboratory experiments but as things demanding a sensitive and imaginative perception. The A.F.S.C. has confidence in truth. It does not, in my observation, even seek to obtain an all-pacifist "faculty" for any of its Institutes. Indeed, even so, the chief cause of alarm at faculty meetings always seemed to be the speed at which

young people—many if not most of them—confronted for the first time with a challenge to conventional assumptions, were reaching radical conclusions. We were so anxious that they should not too lightly accept new ideas (including pacifism itself) that more than once an extremely able performance as a "Devil's Advocate" was given by one of the "resource people," in order to give these young revolutionaries something solid for their new teeth. The result of this tactic was the immediate development of the young people and of their arguments. Some of them, defending what was to them a new position, said things which will remain in my memory for the freshness of perception that they conveyed.

Another useful tactic which was practised successfully, and greatly appreciated by boys and girls, was that of asking questions rather than making statements—essentially the Socratic method. The "resource person" conducting a discussion on these lines would often find, very early in the discussion, that certain words ("Socialism" and "Communism" would be very obvious instances) had sinister connotations. This would be the signal for an immediate investigation of any such word. What was it that made it so fearful? Was it the factual content of the word, and, if so, why? If not, was the word just a kind of swear-word, used to create prejudice? By looking into the *emotional* content of a word and the reasons for its being favourably regarded, we were able to help the young people do their own thinking rather than accept the ready-made ideas of others. But even this process had its limits. Under wise direction I have participated at sessions when the whole faculty sat in silence, just listening while boys and girls wrestled with problems. One learned that way—at least I did—to have much more confidence in the belief that truth is great and will prevail. I remember one such occasion when the Dean of the Faculty who had himself insisted on this procedure sat on the grass beside me, tearing it up by the handful in impotent impatience because the kids seemed to be heading into an intellectual blind alley. We looked at each other, almost holding our breath, and once there was a muttered exchange—we both knew the very word they needed, but neither of us could speak! And then...a boy of nineteen said it, and he said it with more beauty and more force than either of us could have given to it.

That flair for the right thing, which could develop within one week of intensive discussions, took many forms. On one occasion a group of fairly extroverted "teenagers"—though mentally above the average—sat round a camp fire on the last evening, after hours of hilarity. I was asked to speak, to

sum up as well as I could in a short time the experiences of the week. When I had finished, being deeply moved myself by the ending of an unforgettable comradeship, I feared that there would be fresh bursts of superficial gaiety—such as I too had enjoyed so recently, but felt to be no longer in keeping with the moment. Instead there was a brief silence and then the kids started to sing softly. The song they chose expressed all the aspiration which was in my own heart for them and for their future. They left the camp fire, still singing, clasping hands in the dark in a deep ritual of farewell.

So far as the A.F.S.C. could arrange it, all these projects were inter-racial and often inter-national. There was difficulty, however, in getting Negroes to the work camps —it was not enough to offer bursaries, because most of the coloured people belong to poorer classes and a young Negro student generally has to earn money in his vacation. He might be able to afford a week's time for an Institute, and many, of course, were found in the industrial projects, sharing the communal life provided by the A.F.S.C.; but a six weeks' work camp would be more difficult. So it happened that there were no Negroes in the two work camps which I visited. But when the campers at one of these made a week-end excursion into "segregated" territory they decided to refuse all facilities offered only to white people. They had themselves reached the conclusion that, although (by mere chance) there were *no* Negroes in their group, they should *act as though there were.*

One of the girls—she was about sixteen—recalled this incident later at a discussion in an Institute where I met her again. The discussion turned on what was right and what was "practical" and she told them of the decision made by the work campers. "We had to decide," she said, "which was practical: to live in comfort for three or four days *or to be at peace with yourself afterwards.*"

That's what I mean when I say that the A.F.S.C. method is revolutionary. Kids who would probably never have reached such conclusions, left to themselves, were given a stimulus to think and feel. *They* did the rest, and I am still bewildered at some of the results.

REGINALD REYNOLDS

AVANINDRANATH TAGORE'S CONCEPT OF ART

[**Dr. Sudhir Kumar Nandi's** thesis entitled "Studies in Æsthetics" won the Griffith Memorial Research Prize of the Calcutta University in 1949. He writes this interesting essay about a great pioneer of the Indian Renaissance.—ED.]

Avanindranath is the father of the modern Indian art movement. He drank deep at the fountain of both Eastern and Western art, and imbibed all that was noble and fine in both. Old Indian traditions inspired him. The Westerner Havell initiated him into the mysteries of ancient Indian art. He discerned the excellence of Chinese and Japanese art, and did not hesitate to follow them in some of his sketches and drawings. The Japanese savant and artist, Okakura, made a deep impression on his mind, and helped him a great deal in understanding the true spirit of Japanese art. Tagore also found good guides in Gilerdi and C. L. Palmer. Palmer taught him the technique of oil painting. He also drew inspiration from Ravivarma, then the master artist of India.

Avanindranath headed the revivalist movement in art in twentieth-century India:—

The early years of this century saw the first big and effective protest against the deplorable corruption of India's arts. The small band of pioneers round Avanindranath Tagore opened their eyes and minds wide to all sorts of impressions. Not only did they turn back to the traditional arts of India. . .but they also learned from the arts of further Asia and from the modern movement in Europe.[1]

Thus many an artistic tradition mingled at the confluence of the noble soul that was Avanindranath's, and he imparted his fine universal eclecticism to the movement he led.

Avanindranath identifies art and beauty, and this beauty has truth for its pedestal. The so-called ugly object of experience could be a subject of art, and consequently beautiful, if it receives proper re-orientation at the hands of a true artist.[2] Art is beautiful and it is true. False pretensions are ugly. Keats identified truth and beauty, and Tagore follows in his footsteps. We also had similar views from such a savant as Romain Rolland, who said categorically that, if art had anything to do with dabbling in falsity, we had better say good-bye to all art. His single-minded devotion to truth only made Tagore's art all the more fascinating, and it had its appeal to all who knew how to read the cryptic language of fine arts.

Of course artistic truth is different from facts. For Tagore, "Truth"

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[1] "Indian Painting," By R. V. LEYDEN in *The Times of India Annual*, 1952.

[2] *Bagishwari Lectures*. By AVANINDRANATH TAGORE. p. 213.

had a different connotation. He did not mean that art should be mere photographs of what we see all around us. Artistic truth and truth in the sense of correspondence with facts are different. Artistic anatomy is different from medical anatomy.[3] Artistic anatomy fluctuates and changes. It is a chameleon. History and art are different. Gibbon is a historian; Cæsar is an artist. One wrote the history of Rome and the other created history. One is a chronicler of facts with no freedom of his own; the other is an artist enjoying the full freedom of creation. So truth in the artistic sense should not be confused with truth in the common sense. Fictions and fairy tales are valued as works of art. They have a different standard of evaluation and it is not correspondence with facts.

This view of Avanindranath had the approval of his illustrious uncle Rabindranath Tagore. Rabindranath characterized art as Maya. It does not follow reality or care for any faithful representation thereof. It is deceptive—it creates a world of illusion. It is a sort of magic—of course, not in any ignoble sense. The seedling is made to sprout up without a seed. Man is made out of the moon and the moon out of man. That is what actually the artist does.[4]

Bertrand Russell has told us that a student of philosophy should not be afraid of paradoxes. The world of art and the world of experience, though different in their very nature, are not completely divorced from each other. They are somehow related in the broad compass of an appreciating mind. There is a continuity from one world to the other—from the world of experience to the world of art. Art is unity,[5] and this unity is a type of coherence in its different parts or aspects. The artist sees unity in the diversity of nature. The many are harmonized into a rounded whole and the appearance of unity becomes a reality with the artist. He sees nature and creates it. For an artist, seeing is creating and his creation does not follow natural laws.[6] That is why Tagore again and again told us that art is *Niyati-krita-niyama-rahita* (without the laws made by nature). It follows nature but also surpasses it. There is a continuity, a passage from one to the other. This coherence is not only vital for any true work of art but also necessary for a proper appreciation of it. Without a sympathetic feeling towards the work of art, no one could appreciate its beauty. If it grates on one's imagination, a work of art is rejected as a failure. Thus it must cohere, it must agree, with the appreciator's mental disposition.

[3] "*Shilpa O Deha tattva*," *op. cit.*, p. 105.
[4] "*Asundar*," *Lectures*, p. 213.
[5] "*Lavanya*," *Bagishwari Lectures*, p. 381.
[6] *Bharat Shilper Shadanga*, p. 25.

So a work of art must cohere in its different parts; somehow cohere with nature; and cohere also with the appreciating mind. The artist, to quote Tagore,[7] "brings the life that is pulsating in the diversity of natural forms to bear upon his creation. His brush becomes the vehicle of his will to create and unites the artist's universe, the artist and his creation in a rounded whole." Tagore believed that the six laws of painting as prescribed by our *shastras* were meant for bringing together in a close harmony the creator, the creation, the appreciator and the content of the creation.

On the one hand we have the shackles that nature offers in the form of her laws, on the other hand we have the freedom of the world of imagination. Art attempts a synthesis of the two. It creates an image that sometimes looks natural and sometimes does not, and yet it outshines nature in point of perfection. For an artist nature might be the starting point but not the goal. This problem of art has been ably described by Bracquemont :—

> Art has been pursuing the Chimera attempting to reconcile two opposites, the most slavish fidelity to nature and the most absolute independence, so absolute that the work of art may claim to be a creation.

The mimetic element in art does not in any way affect its character as creation. The artist creates a novel quality which makes art what it is. Man as an artist becomes a second creator.[8] He gives birth to shape and form in a world where there were none. Rhyme and rhythm are his own creation and he imparts life to the inert and the dead. That is the business with which the artist busies himself.

Let us understand this nature-art relation. To make art a true creation we must be selective and interpretative. We must have ears to hear and eyes to see. To see what was never on sea or land is not ordinary seeing; to hear the whispers of the spirit of the woodland we need a Wordsworth's ears. All that we see and hear cannot be reproduced in the domain of art. If it is so reproduced it flags, becomes stale and tiring. This view of Tagore had a wide support in many quarters. Weirtz writes: "Nothing is so tiring as a constant close imitation of life. One comes back inevitably to imaginative work." This world of imagination give us relief from the boredom of repetitive experiences. It is André Malraux's "*musée imaginaire*" or "museum of imagination" that makes an artist what he is supposed to be. There he finds all the treasures left to him as a legacy by men of talent and taste. He selects material and forms therefrom, and gleans crude facts from nature. His

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 11.
[8] "*Drishti O Srishti*," *Bagishwari Lectures*, p. 52.

æsthetic sense would teach him what to select from nature and how to do it. Like an adept gardener,[9] an artist is to select the materials for his work of art. "Artistic reality" is to be picked up from a world of "inartistic realities." This realization of the "artistic" and the "inartistic" is innate in every true artist; it can hardly be acquired. This concept of the "innateness" of artistic insight which we find in Tagore is shared by many well-known artists and art critics. To quote R. G. Hatton :—

> There is true and false realization, there is a realization which seeks to impress the vital essence of the subject and there is a realization which bases its success upon its power to present a deceptive illusion.

This "realization which seeks to impress the vital essence of the subject" is the artist's.

Art is to supplement nature. Nature is handicapped by matter, and art is the handiwork of spirit. In art, spirit speaks to spirit. The philosophy of the Upanishads inspired the Indian mind for ages and the Tagores were initiated into the tenets of this great philosophy at an early age. Avanindranath believed that the absolute mind touched all true works of art and made them what they were. Rabindranath shared his belief. Rabindranath defined art as the "response of man's creative soul to the call of the real."[10] Similar definitions of art may be found in the West. Van Loon, for example, writes:—

> Man, even at his proudest moments, is a puny and helpless creature when he compares himself to the Gods. For the Gods speak unto him through creation. Man tries to answer, he tries to vindicate himself and that answer, that vindication—is really what we call art.[11]

This response of man is a new creation, a new entity pitted against the divine creation. It plays with empirical data and brings forth the light that never was on sea or land.

Tagore considers art to be interpretative. It interprets nature and suggests a new meaning to all the drab and mechanical ways of nature. This suggestiveness is the business of art. He quotes relevant lines from Gilbert:—

> Art interprets the mightier speech of nature. It is a poetical language for it is an utterance of the imaginated addressed to the imaginated and to rouse emotion.[12]

Tagore has given an interesting account of how reality is transformed and transmuted and is given a new habitation and a name in the artist's imagination.[13] The account is really fascinating and opens up a new vista of the working of the

[9] *"Shilper Sacalata O Acalata," Bagishwari Lectures*, p. 77.
[10] *Religion of Man*, p. 139.
[11] *The Arts of Mankind*, p. 25.
[12] *"Shilper Sacalata O Acalata," Bagishwari Lectures*, p. 80.
[13] *Jodasankor Dhare*, pp. 151–2.

artist's mind. His imagination obeys its own laws. No set rule is there for him which demands abject surrender. Set rules are meant for the art students and not for the artist; classical images of Gods and Goddesses demand a rigid conformity to all that is laid down in the *shastras*; but with regard to image-making of other varieties the artist must enjoy complete freedom.[14] The true artist's mind is like a stream overflowing its banks on one side, where there are the rules of law. But just as a river forms new lands and pastures on one bank while destroying everything that comes on the other, so is the artist's creative energy. It breaks through the age-old traditions only to create new ones. It disobeys the traditional do's and don't's only to obey the inner law of the artist's mind. In this sense the artist must be absolutely free. Tagore considers this absolute freedom from all outside dictations essential for the creation of true works of art. That is why he repudiated the copy theory again and again.[15] In his brochure entitled *Bharat Shilper Shadanga,* we come across copious quotations from Bowie's noted book, *On the Laws of Japanese Painting,* and these quotations were meant to show that art does not reproduce what we see in nature.

They paint what they feel rather than what they see. . . . It is the artistic impression which they strive to perpetuate in their work.[16]

The artist's work is done when the subjective impressions are objectified. That is why Benedetto Croce defined art as "desubjectification of subjective feelings."

The land of the neo-idealist Croce afterwards showed signs of a definite swing towards realism. The leader of this neo-realist movement was Luchino Visconti. Cesare Zavattini, another exponent of this school, explains their mission thus :—

We want to show the wonders of reality. Our idea is to show people things that happen under their own eyes, to enable them to savor, to enjoy the flavor of every day.

But this craze for presenting the crudely real in art has already shown signs of decaying influence. People do not like to face the same ugliness of life there in the world of art. "Lack of sound and constructive optimism" in their productions has made the neo-realist movement unpopular in Italy. An exact copy or a close proximity to reality does not make any art great.

Avanindranath did not share the view of these neo-realists. He stood for selected and embellished nature. Nature so reorientated could find a place in the world of art. Illustra-

[14] *Bharat Shilpa Murti,* p. 3.
[15] *"Drishti O Srishti," Bagishwari Lectures,* p. 33; *"Rupa Dekha," Lectures,* p. 277.
[16] *On the Laws of Japanese Painting,* p. 8.

tions of this theory could be found in quite a large number among the works of Avanindranath. Paintings and sketches like "*Shahjahaner Mrityu*" and "In Mid-Sea" could be cited as instances in point. The pathos in "*Shahjahaner Mrityu*" came from the bleeding heart of a father who had lost his beloved daughter only a few days back.

For a comparison, we may refer to the paintings of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, as a representative of that tribe of artists whose landscape paintings are acclaimed the best in the world. Madame Chiang's paintings showed her faith in an æsthetics akin to that of Avanindranath. But she was not always successful in "desubjectifying" her feelings in the right way. Often she grew over-realistic and her paintings lost much of the charm and beauty that we find in her less realistic works. Two of her paintings, "Looking up Miao Kao Terrace" and "Winter Pines," appeal to a casual visitor to an art-gallery. When these two pieces are contrasted with two other paintings, "Autumn Garden Party" and "Four Occupations," by the same artist, the truth of our contention becomes apparent. It has been said of Madame Chiang that she paints from memory; but this does not hold good of the last-named pieces of painting. There we find that an allegiance to the "real" has taken away much of the charm and suggestiveness that we find in the first-named paintings.

According to Tagore, the artist's business is the creation of a different world of values, which is far away from the world of mundane existence. His mind's eye far surpasses the capacities of the most powerful telescope;[17] and discovers fairy lands which we common people could never possibly see. This artist is everywhere. He might live here as an Avanindranath and there as a Bacon in a different perspective. It was a Bacon who could discover his New Atlantis far away from the din and bustle of this world of ours. Bacon was sure of his place there.

> He knew that when he put out to sea there would await him, undisturbed by the tides of time, a great Island of Utopia, his own *New Atlantis*—one of the dreams of his philosophical system—glittering in the sunlight of Eternity.[18]

His pen immortalized his dream. The visionaries testify to the veracity of Tagore's observation that the business of art is creation of a different set of values and not mere mimicry.

SUDHIR KUMAR NANDI

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[17] "*Drishti O Srishti,*" *Bhagishwari Lectures*, p. 51.

[18] *Living Biographies of Great Philosophers.* By HENRY THOMAS and DANA LEE THOMAS. p. 99.

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

ONE SOURCE, ONE GOAL*

So many students and citizens of Montreal came to hear the short series of lectures on "East and West," which were given by Dr. Radhakrishnan in 1954 under the auspices of McGill University, that it was necessary to transfer them from a lecture-hall to a vast gymnasium. That, one feels, was symbolically apt. At any rate the final reaction was suitably athletic. The audience of some 3,000 people jumped to its feet in a spontaneous ovation of sustained applause. There is little for a reviewer of the published text of these lectures to do but add his own belated and feeble but no less enthusiastic plaudit.

Dr. Radhakrishnan's title refers, of course, not to East and West Europe but to Asia and the West, the twain that are fated, so we used to be told, never to meet. Radhakrishnan will have none of that deadly dualism. "There is not," he roundly asserts to begin with, "an Eastern view which is different from the Western view of life." From common beginnings, of which the Indo-European language group is an eloquent reminder, Eastern and Western peoples have developed rather different potentialities of human nature, but "today both of them are tackling the same problem, the reconciliation of the values of mind with those of spirit."

A culture is to be understood, Radhakrishnan emphasizes, in terms of the norms and beliefs which sustain it, the spiritual forces which determine its social framework. For "a culture is not the superstructure of the material means of production, as the Marxists believe." The danger he does not directly deal with is that the Marxist proposition is becoming the more accurate description of societies dragged along by their own industrial Juggernauts, in which the formative influences are provided, with unprecedented intensity, not by saints, artists and teachers but by television, the pulp press and active worship of the bitch-goddess of success measured strictly in material terms.

The antithesis of this is the primordial Indian wisdom that Radhakrishnan defines in authoritative aphorisms. "All growth is from within outwards. Spirit is freedom. True wealth is in being, not in having. A free mind is not a herd mind." The essential distinction between insight and ideology is equally clear: "It is not a question of merely entertaining ideas. It is a transforming knowledge, a reshaping of personality, a renewal of being." The brief philosophical development of these truths is not beyond any intelligent reader. "Being is not directly accessible to rational analysis as are concepts formed by abstraction. It is essentially unconceptualisable. It is unreachable by abstraction." And consequently, "the language in which the truth is expressed consists of many dialects adapted to the needs of the different peoples. They are different means to the single end. The differences are fascinating but subordinate; the unity is the reality." Hence, too, the essentially tolerant attitude of India to all higher religions.

The story of the West, on the other hand, is the adventure, sometimes a

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* *East and West: Some Reflections.* By S. RADHAKRISHNAN. McGill University, Beatty Memorial Lectures. First Series, 1954. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 140 pp. 1955. Cloth, 10*s.* 6*d.*; Paper, 6*s.*)

very ruthless adventure, of the enquiring mind. For the Greeks, their cultural superiority to the surrounding barbarians was not a matter of colour or of race but of quality of mind. Yet Greece could produce Socrates, an incarnation of that higher wisdom which seeks to bring the dialects of human awareness to their own maturity, as languages all potentially capable of expressing truth. Somewhat surprisingly, in view of his emphasis on non-violence, Radhakrishnan's other great Western culture-hero is Alexander. The reason is not far to seek. "The two-way traffic between East and West became possible after Alexander broke down the frontiers which had hitherto separated them." The account of the West goes on, of course, to the Roman concept of order, the impact and absorption of Christianity and the development of scientific thought, on which a reviewer may limit himself to the laconic comment of Father Augustine Baker, explaining two chapters of *The Cloud of Unknowing*: "It is good doctrine and all plain enough in itself."

But with the culmination of this story in nuclear physics and the resulting choice between total destruction of human civilization and an unfoldment of a future which is beyond the present dreams of mankind, a solemn sense of urgency must have pervaded the packed gymnasium in Montreal. Dr. Radhakrishnan declared that "we are not the helpless tools of determinism. History is the story of the incalculable." The real struggle is not between two or more great power-groups, but between "two claimants for the soul of man. The spirit of materialism which we are called upon to fight is not alien to us but seems to be congenial to the whole world."

"We cannot base the new civilization on science and technology alone," he insisted. "They do not furnish a reliable foundation. We must learn to live from a new basis, if we wish to avoid the catastrophe that threatens us." That new basis must be a creative religion, born of the union of East and West. For "each one of us is both Eastern and Western....They are two possibilities which every man in every age carries within himself.... The meeting of East and West today may produce a spiritual renaissance and a world community that is struggling to be born." And the last words, which brought his great audience cheering to its feet, were: "The separation of East and West is over. The history of the new world, the one world, has begun. It promises to be large in extent, varied in colour, rich in quality." That is not the statement of an idea; it is the voice of transforming knowledge promising renewal of being. The East has spoken. Where is the voice in the West that will reply?

ROY WALKER

Yoga: Uniting East and West. By SELVARAJAN YESUDIAN and ELISABETH HAICH. Foreword by T. HUZELLA. Translated by JOHN P. ROBERTSON from the German *Yoga in den zwei Welten.* (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 161 pp. Illustrated. 1956. 12*s.* 6*d.*)

Selvarajan Yesudian, brought up a Christian against a background of Indian tradition, has lived many years in the West. Through *Yoga* man

> passes from the personal, little human SELF to the divine OVERSELF...and merged into God, he experiences the unity that animates mankind. Only people who have reached perfection on the individual path can practise the sacred community based on brotherly love...

The book is most stimulating.

E.W.

The Knights. By ARISTOPHANES. Translated into English Rhyming Verse with Introduction and Notes by GILBERT MURRAY. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 135 pp. 1956. 8*s.* 6*d.*)

The Knights of Aristophanes, produced in 424 B.C., when Athens was already feeling the exhaustion of nearly a decade of war, is remarkable as much for its political as for its literary significance. It illustrates at its worst and its best that extreme form of democracy favoured in the Greek City State of the fifth century B.C., which expected from its citizens personal participation in government. Pericles had died of the plague which destroyed nearly a third of the population. He was succeeded by Cleon, a demagogue typical of a class of politicians who were to guide the fortunes of Athens until its defeat. Cleon was vulgar, blustering, imperialist, ruthless and utterly unscrupulous. With no military training or experience, he nevertheless won the confidence of the majority by cheap oratory and cajolery of the gullible masses. Above all he found popular support for a policy which entailed a "jingoist" furtherance of Athenian interests regardless of friend, foe or neutral. On the other hand, he was opposed by men of more moderate opinion, representing for the most part the aristocracy, the middle classes and the farmers who believed that peace was possible with Sparta, and who resented the enforced abandonment of their estates to the devastation consequent upon an annual Peloponnesian invasion. Aristophanes leaves us in no doubt as to which side he favoured.

The story of the play is an allegory. Two prominent Athenian generals appear as two slaves in the house of their master, Demos. They resent the intrusion of a new slave, Paphlagon (Cleon), who by assiduous flattery and informing had secured for himself favours from his master and whippings for his fellow slaves. The others plot to introduce into the household an Offal-monger who can "out-Cleon Cleon" in vulgarity and unscrupulousness. A slanging-match of incredible ferocity ensues, exhibiting a degree of free speech which subsequent history could scarcely parallel. The Offal-monger wins, becomes the "Chosen of the People," as his name Agoracritus implies, boils and rejuvenates his testy old master, Demos, who goes off gaily with Peace as his young bride, while Paphlagon slinks off to a life of sausage-selling and sin. The Chorus are the Knights, members of the aristocratic cavalry class, whose incidental lyrics breathe a nostalgic yearning for peace.

The corruption of a Cleon, the evils of demagogy, the triumph of mass hysteria over reason, are nowhere better illustrated than in this play. Wartime, of course, does not provide the conditions in which democracy shows to best advantage. Yet compensations there are in the democratic way of life which permits so frank a statement of a point of view opposed to that of the government, which allows a protest against the rabid imperialism of a Cleon, and is ready to listen to a voice raised in defence of the neglected Islanders. Most remarkable of all is the high level of understanding presupposed in the audience. The extensive vocabulary, the jokes, the puns, the indirect allusions, the literary references, all bespeak a close attention in the audience as well as a high level of education and understanding that have rightly won for the ancient Greeks the admiration of posterity.

Professor Gilbert Murray has once more put us all in his debt with his vigorous and racy translation. His rhymed verse is rich, scholarly and yet natural, so that we scarcely feel that we are reading a translation. He transports us back two thousand years to a point in history where we can see many of our own problems on a smaller scale but in sharper outline. He performs a triple service in bringing this great

comedy to the Greekless, in writing verse that stands in its own right as poetry, and in making us think again over some of the fundamental problems of popular rule. Such are the functions in the modern world of the classical scholar.

T. W. MELLUISH

Anthology of Japanese Literature from the Earliest Era to the Mid-nineteenth Century. Compiled and edited by DONALD KEENE. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 444 pp. 1956. 30*s.*)

It is fitting that Dr. Keene should dedicate his masterly compendium of the riches of Japanese poetry and prose to Arthur Waley, than whom there has been no greater translator from that difficult language, and who has done more than any other scholar of his time to introduce the beauty and wisdom of the East to Western readers. This anthology is the first of its kind, and specialists in the subject may find important omissions here and there, but most certainly the compiler will attract the greatest praise and gratitude for what has been included, and for his loving devotion to his difficult task.

Dr. Keene takes his passages from great or characteristic works written from the earliest times up to about 1868, at the close of the "Tokugawa Period," concentrating wisely on writings which are most likely to interest readers of English because they can be translated into that language in a style which will at once make an enjoyable appeal and attract attention by its content.

How wisely he has chosen is immediately apparent to those who merely dip into the volume here and there. Scarcely a page opened at random does not lure one on. But readers would be well advised to treat this anthology as a composite whole for reading from beginning to end, returning to certain extracts for re-reading at intervals. Thus the exquisite charm of "The Lady Who Loved Insects" from an anonymous writer of the twelfth century, presented here in Arthur Waley's own inspired version, is best judged in its place chronologically about halfway into the book; but most certainly few readers will be satisfied with a single reading.

Where possible, Dr. Keene uses classic translations; where these do not exist, or where he finds the standard version unsatisfactory for twentieth-century readers, he provides his own versions. Hence much of the contents appears in English for the first time. This in itself will make the book a standard and indispensable one which will be wanted in every type of public, university, college and school library.

In addition to the general principle governing the selection of passages, the compiler-translator has chosen extracts from works in the characteristic forms of literature, so that the reader will find his anthology "as representative as possible of the different *genres* of Japanese literature—poetry, novels, plays, diaries . . . ." Moreover, there are passages even from Japanese writers who used the classical Chinese language to express their profoundest thoughts, much as, for example, most English writers up to the sixteenth century used Latin rather than the then unformed native prose.

Although he admits the impossibility of conveying into English the poignant delicacy of the poems known as the *Shinkokinshū*, an anthology (the eighth of its kind) which was compiled by Imperial order at the beginning of the thirteenth century, Dr. Keene has succeeded in making this section of his book one to which readers will return again and again. Many will find the simplicity of the emotions, the fragility of poetic structure, the fairylike touch (which though it would leave gossamer

unharmed, yet goes straight to the heart of a modern) quite irresistible. Who in the East Anglia region of today, for example, could fail to respond to Saigyō's exquisite little sigh:—

> Even to someone
> Free of passions this sadness
> Would be apparent:
> Evening in autumn over
> A marsh where a snipe rises.

And where in the world is there a bereaved human who would not share across the centuries and the barriers of an antique world the poignant grief of Fujiwara no Shunzei (1114-1204) expressed timelessly in:—

> When I stare off
> At the far sky where you are,
> In excess of grief,
> Filtering through the mists
> The spring rains are falling.

Of the masterpieces of prose writings, probably the most widely read in English (thanks to the genius of Arthur Waley) is Lady Murasaki's *The Tale of Genji*, written during the first decade of the eleventh century. The separate volumes are not all available now, but the complete "omnibus" edition of over 1,100 pages is in print (Allen and Unwin, 35*s*.). Dr. Keene's finely chosen episode will whet the appetite of those who have yet to appreciate this unbelievable work.

This notable volume should be in wide and constant demand for many decades, and its compiler must be congratulated and thanked in no uncertain terms for giving us such an invaluable treasure for our delight.

F. SEYMOUR SMITH

West Indian Folk Tales: Anansi Stories: Tales from West Indian Folklore. Retold for English Children by LUCILLE IREMONGER. (George G. Harrap and Co., Ltd., London. 64 pp. Illustrated. 1956. 5*s*.)

If in the days of your youth you made the acquaintance of Brer Fox and Brer Rabbit through the Uncle Remus tales, and are still able to think of them with affection, then you will certainly enjoy the *Anansi Stories*, for they are very similar. Lucille Iremonger tells us in her Preface that "Anansi is the god of the Spider People. He is not a spider, but can change himself into one, or anything else he likes. He is a little bald black man, always up to mischief."

This book tells ten short stories dealing with the pranks and adventures of Brer Anansi: Brer Tiger used to walk upright, but Brer Anansi .... Brer Wasp had no sting until Brer Anansi .... Brer Peacock had a golden voice, but one day Brer Anansi .... and so on. The stories are charmingly told in simple English, which, in my opinion, is infinitely preferable to the use of the Negro dialect, as it makes for much easier and pleasanter reading. All the tales deal with animals who behave and talk like human beings; for instance:—

> Brer Wasp was a handsome fellow, as he still is, and very proud of his striped clothes. In those days he was very proud of his teeth too. He had two rows of fine white teeth, and he liked to show them off. He was always laughing, even when he had nothing to laugh about. This made him popular. He always had a crowd of friends about him.

I think we have met humans very like that! These stories have a freshness and a charm all their own, and we are grateful to Lucille Iremonger for having brought them to us.

C.B.

An Introduction to the French Poets: Villon to the Present Day. By GEOFFREY BRERETON. (Methuen and Co., Ltd., London. xv+302 pp. 1956. 25*s*.)

This stimulating book will be of value not only to the student but to poetry lovers in general. Dr. Brereton, sweeping through the magnificent range of French poetry with vigour and a discerning mind, has brushed away many cobwebs in the form of smothering generalizations and prejudice.

One of his attacks is upon the indiscriminate use of the term "baroque" so much in vogue, especially on the Continent, where even Shakespeare is labelled baroque. This current fashion, at its worst travestying, making almost monstrous whatever is opposed to classicism, has, in Dr. Brereton's view, "accumulated a rich store of confusion for the future student"; although, he admits, it has "led to a re-examination of neglected poets and has thrown new light on their works."

The triumph, the beauty of French "classicism," poetry derived from Greece and coming to perfection in Jean Racine, has largely fallen on deaf ears here in England, partly from the inability of even a cultured foreigner to detect delicate shades of tone and meaning but also because our stable poetic diet has been Shakespeare and the other great Elizabethans leading on to the Romantics of the early nineteenth century. One of our debts to Dr. Brereton is therefore his presentation of Racine as a poet more intimate, one more than "functional," a dramatist who expresses majestically in high-sounding dialogue the action and emotions of a tragedy. He has extracted lines for us which stand alone as poetry simple and moving, as in *Phèdre*: *Le jour n'est pas plus pur que le fond de mon cœur.*

Dr. Brereton's treatment of those poets who broke away from the classical tradition (though still retaining many of its characteristics) is all the stronger because he avoids or modifies such "labels" as *parnassien* and Symbolist, labels adopted by the poets involved, who, like true Frenchmen, felt an urge to classify themselves. In this section of the book the short life histories he gives are of peculiar value, the most poignant being that of André Chenier, who, from the accident of being found in the house of a suspected person, ended his life on the guillotine. Standing with one foot in the old and one in the new world, Chenier records directly his emotions on awaiting death in prison, seeing others carried off for execution, but in terms of "noble" poetry: *Au pied de l'échafaud j'essaye encore ma lyre.* This unfortunate poet, in the words of Dr. Brereton, died "with a rhetorical flourish and in impeccably laundered linen." Preoccupation with death was to become a characteristic of the Romantic poets to follow, but a preoccupation expressed in terms starker, more direct, as in Baudelaire's comment on aged women: *Eves octogénaires, Sur qui pèse la griffe effroyable de Dieu.*

Though not attributing to Arthur Rimbaud the importance a certain school has given him, Dr. Brereton presents that young phenomenon as a master of imagery greater perhaps than "any French poet before him," recognizing his *Bateau ivre* as "the first great Symbolist poem." His treatment of Baudelaire—a poet, I think, more familiar, more understandable to English readers—is also of particular interest.

The one criticism I have to make is a minor one applicable to most modern works of scholarship: a mere list of names in an index gives no clue to the book as a whole and is of little help in reference. But this, no doubt, is an inevitable outcome of an age both expensive and parsimonious.

DOROTHY HEWLETT

The Craft of Letters in England: A Symposium. Edited by JOHN LEHMANN. (The Cresset Press, London. viii+248 pp. 1956. 21*s*.)

While the P.E.N. Club was enjoying its international discussions at its annual Congress held this year in London, a number of writers had already been asked, in honour of the event, to contribute to a symposium which should give some idea of the present state of literature in England. Several branches have to be considered; and a word of praise should go to Mr. Lehmann as editor for his work behind the scenes in so arranging and allotting subjects that there is no overlapping. In fact, each contributor gives the remarkable illusion of having read all the others before writing his own piece. The illusion is borne out by a certain similarity of mood and outlook, registering not despondency but some dissatisfaction with the present position and a lack of unforced confidence in the future.

Mr. Lehmann sets the tone himself by declaring that in the twenty-five years under review the giants have left us. Now, instead of one man's influence we have schools—whether of poetry, fiction, biography or criticism. And schools, one may say, bear somewhat the same relation to creative genius as a church congregation bears to the prophet or inspirer of its faith. It may even be an ominous portent that some of the most vigorous chapters here concern the borderland of literary art. For example, Mr. L. D. Lerner writes on "The New Criticism," meaning for the most part the Eliot, Leavis and Empson schools; and Mr. Paul Bloomfield studies the merits and failings of its critical predecessor, "The Bloomsbury Tradition." But how is criticism to keep itself alive unless there is original matter to feed it with? Let us take fiction then. Mr. Francis Wyndham discusses "Twenty-five Years of the Novel" and implies that the best talents are crowded into its earlier part. This may be because he has had to break off, leaving "Experiment and the Future of the Novel" for Mr. Philip Toynbee, who cannot adequately answer his own query as to why anyone in 1956 should try to write a serious novel. Being himself an "experimental" novelist, Mr. Toynbee does not get sufficiently outside the matter to give any general hints on where the novel is going.

Again, take poetry. Here Mr. Roy Fuller ostensibly surveys the poetic tradition of the quarter century, but gives rather less than the available richness (to omit such names as De la Mare and Blunden borders on absurdity), being hampered by his own prejudices as a writer of poetry. Mr. G. S. Fraser, in "The Poet and His Medium," carries on the inquiry, not, as we might naively have hoped, towards creation, but in a down-to-earth confidential chat about radio readings, pamphlet publications and other chances for the practising poet. His hope, however Utopian, is that such encouragement will work against, not for, the setting up of mere commerical values.

Two well-established branches of applied literature emerge from this examination with a cleaner health bill. Mr. J. I. M. Stewart, concerned with biography, finds, to be sure, that prejudice or scandal may heat the blood, and that Freudian prescriptions have their danger; but a scholarly background and a novelist's insight have been increasingly combined to make a sound Life readable and a popular Life accurate. In a thoughtful article on "Historical Writing" Miss C. V. Wedgewood finds these two qualities of scholarship and popularity often bitterly opposed; yet historians are broadening their approach, enlarging their public, and going—for all their controversies over narrative *versus* theory—from strength to strength. Not so the dramatists, as Mr. T. C. Worsley sadly admits in exploring the gap between the cultural and commercial theatres. Mr. Maurice Cranston rounds up philosophy,

religion and political science into "The Literature of Ideas," and Mr. Erik de Mauny covers "The Progress of Translation." It is left to Mr. Alan Pryce-Jones to contribute the essay that charms as a piece of writing: in "The Personal Story" he ponders on the curious circumstance that leads so many writers to use their own lives, thoughts and experiences as the backbone or foreground of their works.

SYLVA NORMAN

The Songs and Sonets of John Donne. An Editio Minor with Introduction and Explanatory Notes by THEODORE REDPATH. (Methuen and Co., Ltd., London. lii+155 pp. 1956. 18*s*.)

Donne's "Songs and Sonets" belong, with his Holy Sonnets, among the great masterpieces of English poetry. They are, admittedly, not easy poems. Jonson's, Dryden's and Samuel Johnson's criticisms are well known, and it was not until the nineteenth century that poets, and not until the twentieth that a wider public, began to realize that Donne's poetic language was one of the glories of our literature, not one of its stumbling-blocks. It is now a generation since T. S. Eliot put Donne on the literary map as far as criticism and appreciation are concerned, and even longer since Grierson made that possible by producing a proper text. A generation has now absorbed Donne into its reading and into its writing. Or so I thought, until I examined Dr. Redpath's new edition of the "Songs and Sonets." On the evidence of this edition, Grierson, Eliot, Leavis and Penguin Books have all laboured in vain.

Dr. Redpath treats these famous poems with extreme caution and reserve, as if he were handling some new and unknown species of unexploded bomb. His edition resembles those elementary "cribs" we used at school for construing Greek and Latin texts. Donne's use of language is, we know, not the same as that of Tennyson: but it *is* English. Dr. Redpath translates almost every phrase into something that seems almost like Basic English. A Richards might do that and get away with it, but Dr. Redpath entirely lacks Richards's originality (indeed a good part of his book consists of suggestions made by various academic colleagues). Most of the notes suggest that Dr. Redpath's opinion of the intelligence of the general reader and of the members of the Cambridge English School is very low. How else can one account for such "explanations" as "when you stop loving me" for "when thou leav'st," "real" for "true," "finer" for "braver," "in heaven" for "there above," "conspicuous" for "eminent"? Such examples abound on every page of this insulting edition. And do we really need telling that "diamonds" is trisyllabic in line six of "A Valediction: of my name in the window"? Have we no eye for a perfectly regular lyric metre as well as no understanding of our vernacular and no knowledge of life? Do we really have to be told that "Of" in titles like "Of weeping" means "On"? Have we never read any Shakespeare, and so never learnt that the ending "-tion" is commonly dissyllabic in verse of this period?

To make all this even worse, Dr. Redpath cannot offer even the most elementary and obvious interpretation without hedging: phrases like "after much hesitation" abound. The whole tone is that of the dullest kind of extension lecture. "Shall these bones live?" Dr. Redpath's answer is, "Not while I'm around." Three-quarters of this book is the kind of seminar discussion with a backward class that ought never to have achieved the permanence of print. Comments like these never illuminate and usually only irritate. And certainly, if I could not read Donne without assistance of this sort, I should not read him at all. It is to be hoped, for the

sake of the future of English letters, that Dr. Redpath's approach to art, and his estimate of people's intelligence and of the way poetry is actually read, are mistaken.

K. W. GRANSDEN

Tantrarahasya: A Primer of Prabhakara Mimamsa. By RAMANUJACHARYA; edited by R. SHAMA SHASTRY; critically edited with Introduction and Appendices by K. S. RAMASWAMI SASTRI. (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. XXIV. Oriental Institute, Baroda. lxxxiv+83 pp. Second edition, 1956. Rs. 8/-)

This work, first edited by Dr. R. Shama Shastry and published in 1922 in the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, has long been before scholars. It was then eagerly welcomed by students of Indian philosophy as an important addition to the scant literature available on Prabhakara Mimamsa, a system which had suffered most by unmerited neglect and unfavourable criticism. Though a late author (*c.* sixteenth century), Ramanujacharya—different from his distinguished namesake who propagated the Vishishtadvaita system—had access to many original texts now lost wholly or partially, and has given a comprehensive and connected survey of the basic tenets of Prabhakara's system in a racy and readable style. It is gratifying to note that the two outstanding shortcomings of the first edition, *viz.*, the uncertainty of textual readings and the sketchiness of the editor's Introduction, have been remedied by the learned editor of this edition. It is a pity that no second MS. of the work is extant in the country; Shri Ramaswamy Sastri has carefully compared again the only MS. available with the first edition and has succeeded often in giving better readings.

The value of the present edition is enhanced by the erudite English Introduction attached to it by the editor. It embodies his original studies in the field of Mimamsa thought, particularly in relation to the origin and development of the two divergent schools of Prabhakara and Bhatta. The editor's thesis that Prabhakara was a follower of the thought of Badari, rejected by both Jaimini and Shabara, is certainly ingenious and original; but the evidence marshalled appears inadequate in the absence of proof that Badari and his followers were authors. But it opens out a new line of enquiry to the student of the history of Indian philosophical trends. Again, in showing the divergences between the Prabhakara and Bhatta schools, the editor makes a sharp distinction between the denotations of *dharmajijnasa* and *vedarthavicara*, a distinction difficult to accept without stretching the meanings of words. Apart from these issues, the editor's general exposition of the basic tenets of the system deserves praise for its lucidity and thoroughness.

The general neglect of Purva-mimamsa may be traced to its mistaken identification with liturgy or theology. The truth is that it is primarily philosophical investigation and the very mother of other schools in Indian philosophy. In a truly philosophic temper, it examines the criteria of knowledge and provides the rationale for the infallibility of Vedic scriptures, ruling out at the same time the possibility of other revelations. It propounds the basic rules of interpretation and reconciles the seeming contradictions in the Vedic injunctions. These rules are so scientific that they have been fully utilized by the writers on Hindu Law. With the publication of such attractive volumes on the subject, one may hope for the revival of interest in Purva-mimamsa, without which the study of Vedanta would remain incomplete.

K. KRISHNAMOORTHY

Apastambasrautasutra with *Dhurtasvamibhasya*. Edited by A. CHINNASVAMI SASTRI. (Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. CXXI. Oriental Institute, Baroda. 469+70 pp. 1955. Rs. 20/-)

Among the six ancillary texts (*Vedangas*) attached to each Veda, the *shrauta* is the ritualistic text concerned with the methodology of important Vedic sacrifices like the fire-sacrifice (*agnihotra*), the new-moon and full-moon sacrifices (*darshapaurnamasa*) and the animal sacrifice (*pashu*). These texts are thus important sources for the student of the history of our religion in general and the cult of sacrifice in particular.

The *Shrautasutra* of Apastamba belongs to the *Taittiriya Samhita* and occupies an important place among the works of its class. The text of this ritualistic treatise was edited by Richard Garbe in the *Bibliotheca Indica* (1882-1903). Its first seven *prashnas* were translated into German by W. Caland (Göttingen, 1921). Even the part of the present commentary up to the end of the eighth *prashna* has been published in two volumes of the Mysore Oriental Series. The *Darsapurnamasaprakasa* published in the Anandasrama Sanskrit Series (No. 93, Poona, 1924) is a sort of rehash of portions of this text and commentary.

It is therefore clear that the present edition from Baroda gives neither the text nor the commentary for the first time. Printed, however, in a beautiful bold type characteristic of this important Series and edited by one of the foremost *Mimamsakas* of the traditional type today with his own gloss, this Baroda edition has an importance all its own. But it is by no means complete and gives the text and commentary till the end of the seventh *prashna* only. The detailed Contents and the Index of the *sutras* appended at the end add to the usefulness of this edition. We eagerly await the publication of the remaining *prashnas* of the text and the elaborate introduction which the learned editor promises to include with them.

H. G. NARAHARI

Sribhasyaprakasika. By SRINIVASACARYA; edited by T. CHANDRASEKHARAN. (Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Series, No. 48. Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras. xxvi+29+vii+311 pp. 1955. Rs. 6/8)

The commentary on the *Brahmasutra* by Sri Ramanuja, the great exponent of the Vishishtadvaita school, is known as *Sribhasya*. This volume contains a commentary on the *Sribhasya* by Vadhula Srinivasacarya, son of Nrisimha and disciple of Vadhula Lakshmanacarya. This commentator was otherwise known as Venkatacarya. He composed three other works. According to Shri T. K. Venkatacharya, a great-grandson of this author, Srinivasacarya was born in A.D. 1779. He lived for seventy-six years.

The present commentary contains a summary of the *purvapaksha* and *siddhanta* of every *adhikarana* as explained in the *Sribhasya*. It is written in a lucid style. The commentator shows great regard for Vedantadeshika (A.D. 1286-1364) and his works. Among works quoted by the commentator we find the *Srutaprakasika*, the *Adhikaranasaravali*, *Bhavaprakasika*, *Parasaryavijaya* and *Sarirakabhaskara*.

The present edition of *Sribhasyaprakasika* is based on a single paper manuscript in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, which is complete and free from mistakes. There are two other manuscripts of this commentary in the Library of the Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati. One of these manuscripts, which is incomplete, was made available to the editor after the completion of the printing of this text. Variants from this

manuscript are given in the Appendix to this edition. It is unfortunate that the complete manuscript of the work was not available to the editor. As such works are published at great expense and are not likely to be republished in the near future, all owners of manuscripts will be doing a great service to Sanskrit learning if they keep at the disposal of the Madras Government Oriental Series all their manuscripts of works undertaken for publication in this valuable Series, which has been doing splendid service by publishing unpublished works. The editor of the present volume and the Government of Madras deserve our best thanks for adding this volume to their monumental Series.

P. K. GODE

The Kantian Thing-in-Itself or The Creative Mind. By OSCAR W. MILLER. (Philosophical Library, New York. 142 pp. 1956. $ 3.75)

In the history of modern thought Immanuel Kant holds a dominating position, and his metaphysical theory of Reality has for its central feature his formulation of the two orders of reality—the phenomenal and the noumenal. The thing-in-itself is that substratum of reality of the noumenal region which is the unknowable basis of existence giving rise to the manifoldness of the world.

Dr. Miller subjects this concept to a searching analysis, ranging in his survey over the whole of Greek and European philosophy. Approaching the concept from the point of view of the search for intrinsic value as embodied in the thing-in-itself, he comes to the interesting conclusion that all value is a postulate having its origin in the consciousness of the Self and thence projected outward, obtaining objectivity, which is equated with the power to control the mind's construction of a real world which is as much a projection of the mind as it is based on the stuff presented by nature. He points out the philosophical folly of both Realism and Idealism in trying to separate wholly the datum in a knowledge-situation from the contribution made by the mind. The contribution of the mind is as much part of the constructed reality as the sense-data supplied by nature. The noumenal entity—the thing-in-itself—is actually

> an instrument in the hands of the Self who has created it out of his own reflection for the specific purpose of manipulating the stuff of his data-world.

The things-in-themselves are the offspring of the fundamental "I-in-itself" expressing itself in reflection and concept-values such as God, Soul and Immortality.

This essay is a valuable attempt at a new synthesis.

D. GURUMURTI

Cruelty to and Neglect of Children: Report of a Joint Committee of the British Medical Association and The Magistrates' Association. (British Medical Association, London. 71 pp. 1956. 3*s*.)

This is a valuable reference booklet for anyone engaged or interested in child welfare. The points dealt with by the Committee were the definition of child cruelty and neglect, the means of detection, the underlying causes and the various types recorded. Then, on the constructive side, it considered methods of dealing with cases, measures for prevention and suggestions for new methods and, finally, the question whether further legal powers were necessary for prevention and punishment. The evidence has been gathered from numerous bodies and individuals actively concerned in this field. The general conclusion is that neglect and cruelty

are largely due to ignorance and thoughtlessness, rather than to deliberate intent, and that the remedy lies in the development of the sense of responsibility and of social consciousness. Apart from the various recommendations dealing with the mechanism of preventive measures and treatment, the fundamental one made is that the family should be dealt with as a unit—a very ancient psychological truth.

W.E.W

Freud and Religious Belief. By H. L. Philip. (Rockliff Publishing Corporation, Ltd., London. xi+140 pp. 1956. 18*s.*) Received through the courtesy of the British Council, London.

This short but important book by Dr. Philip, who has the unusual qualifications of being at once a psychologist and a theologian, has a double significance for those who already realize that in attacking religion Freud was attacking something of which he had no knowledge or first-hand experience. Dr. Philip makes this clear by pointing out that, brought up in a home where Jewish Orthodoxy had given way to free thinking and having formed his opinion of Christianity solely on the exoteric aspect of Roman Catholicism, *i.e.*, by watching the ceremonialism and behaviour of the Christian community in which he lived as one of a persecuted minority, Freud had no understanding of what he insisted was an illusion and a universal mass neurosis. But, in proving his point, the author, a profound admirer of Freud as a psychologist and disagreeing only with his attitude to religion, succeeds in casting very grave doubts on the value of his subject as a scientific thinker. For he makes it quite evident that, as regards his religious convictions, Freud himself not only suffered from an obsessional neurosis but also was guilty of that most unscientific behaviour of evolving a theory and then trying to make all the facts agree with it.

Especially was this so in the case of the most popular but pernicious of his theories, the Œdipus complex, which depends for its validity wholly on his personal and quite gratuitous interpretation of the animal-totem worship of primitive tribes. It was an odd interpretation to come from a disciple of Darwin, whose evolutionary theory, long and far better understood by religionists of the East, suggested a much more "scientific" explanation of the animal totem, both in the worship of the animal as a progenitor and the slaying of it to symbolize the evolutionary necessity of naughting the remains of the animal within man.

But no such realization was possible to the "unrepentant atheist" who had never been anything but an atheist from his earliest years and was therefore debarred from the wider experience of spiritual consciousness. As Dr. Philip writes of his otherwise revered master:—

> Obsessed as he was with the problems of physical existence and the boundless progress which science made possible, such other realms as there might be were for him purely dependent ones, little if anything more than shadowy sublimations of energy drawn from sexual sources. Because his concept of reality was so narrow he attempted to explain too much in terms of wishful thinking; and his attempt was probably a functioning of his own wishful thinking—his wish to explain everything in terms of his child and idol, psychoanalysis.

Peter de Morny

Testament of a Liberal. By ALBERT GUERARD. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.; Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, London. xv+222 pp. 1956. 36*s*.)

This book is a brilliantly written diagnosis of the political and social state of health of the United States, with a prescription to put the "patient" on the road to recovery. The author is as well qualified as any single individual can be to tackle such a vast and important subject, having been a teacher in American universities for the past half-century. He was born in France, and brought with him to America a mind richly endowed with European culture and traditions.

This is Mr. Guérard's fourth book on the state of contemporary American society, and he has grouped them together under the title "What the Teacher Learnt." He is Professor of General and Comparative Literature and Lecturer in French Civilization (Emeritus) at Stanford University.

A thinker of precision with a mind well stocked with the lessons of history, Mr. Guérard analyzes the achievements and failings of American society with wisdom and wit. He believes, generally speaking, that the United States, over the past half-century, has, in concentrating so successfully on the production of material wealth, allowed her vision of the "good" life, which inspired her in her national infancy, to become blurred and distorted. She has fallen into the dangerous and, in its outward manifestations, horrible and vulgar habit of accepting half-truths, and sometimes downright falsehoods, as the moral currency of her domestic and international political life.

He admits that his life in America has been "full and pleasant," but adds: "For half a century I have been living under a régime I despised." He despises it for the way it has elevated the profit motive into an ideal, for its political intolerance, which is projected on to the world stage at a time when America, because of her great economic and financial strength, has become a "leading" nation.

America's business today, he says, has become Business. Congress and the Press in America, he asserts, are controlled by a plutocracy—"profits and power shared by all, but with a heavy concentration in the hands of a few."

> It is to the interest of those Happy Few, to keep the fires of hate burning. If the flames were to die, America might have another and more drastic New Deal.

Instead of bringing America a rich and fuller life, Mr. Guérard states, her ever-increasing wealth has clouded American life with fear—fear of criticism, discussion, argument. Fear brings with it hate, hate of anyone and anything that questions whether American power is being used to the best interests of her people and of humanity at large.

An advocate of tolerance in all things, the author notes the virtues of capitalism and conservatism, the contributions they have made and can still make towards fulfilling the *material* needs of civilization. But, with far less direct access to the Soviet way of life, he asserts that Communism has also showed its capacity to solve some of the problems of production and distribution which confronted society when science and technology put into its hands new and revolutionary techniques of manufacture. America is already highly communistic and collectivistic, he points out, as far as Federal and local government activity is concerned and because of the development of the giant industrial undertaking. The shallow moral and political values that are now accepted in America have made men the slaves of words, however, and to suggest that America and Russia, in their industrial and economic techniques, have been pursuing somewhat parallel trends is to run the risk of being denounced, by those who control the established order, as a degenerate or something worse.

SUNDER KABADI

CORRESPONDENCE

HEAVEN AND HELL

[The paper of Professor Price of Oxford University on this subject, which was discussed on October 18th, 1955, at the Indian Institute of Culture, Basavangudi, Bangalore, was published in our issues of January and February 1956 and as that Institute's Reprint No. 16. As its nature insured, it has aroused considerable interest. Last month we published a Note by Dr. Robert H. Thouless. Here is another by the well-known **Professor C. D. Broad.**

Among his cogent comments is the suggestion in his penultimate paragraph of the possibility of the mind of the recently deceased animating some kind of body. This seems perhaps in continuity with his hypothesis put forward in *Philosophy* for October 1949, in connection with the claims for "psychokinesis," "that each of us has a kind of invisible and intangible but extended and dynamical 'body,' besides his ordinary visible and tangible body."

This is quite in line with the classification of human constituents in the ancient East, and fully explained in the writings of H. P. Blavatsky. His broad-minded approach in his final paragraph to reincarnation and "the Wheel of Birth and Death" seems hopeful of increasing recognition by leading Western thinkers that psychical research on scientific lines is not a modern innovation. This attitude has denied all but the most open-minded the many valuable clues which they could gain from their ancient predecessors in the field of psychical research.—ED.]

It is with great pleasure that I respond to an invitation to submit a few comments on the very interesting paper, with the above title, which appeared in THE ARYAN PATH for January and February 1956. The author is a friend of more than thirty years' standing, and we have for long been fellow members of the Council of the Society for Psychical Research.

Professor Price takes as the basis for his speculations about the experiences of disembodied minds the fact of dreaming. Now some quite intelligent contemporary philosophers in England have written about dreams in such a way as to make me wonder if they have ever had any. I can say, for my own part, that I regularly have dreams which in vividness, detail and coherence completely simulate my waking perceptual experiences; that they are accompanied by the same kind of running reflexive commentary as accompanies my waking intercourse with other persons and things; and that in them I frequently make quite apposite and valid inferences. I am therefore perfectly ready to admit that, *if* a disembodied mind can exist, and can have experiences analogous to those which I habitually have when asleep, it would be for it *as if* it were living a highly varied embodied life among other embodied minds and inanimate objects.

But, even if it be allowed that an unembodied mind is conceivable, and that such a mind could have experiences of *some* sort, the occurrence of dreams in us does not suffice to show that it could have experiences analogous to them. All that the occurrence of dreams in us makes certain is this. It shows that an *embodied* mind can have *quasi*-perceptual experiences of a very elaborate character at times when the eyes, ears, skin, etc., are either receiving no physical stimuli from without, or at any rate no such stimuli as would be necessary and sufficient in waking life to evoke a similar train of *actual* perceptions. That certainly does not suffice to show that the sleeper's brain and nervous system are not playing an absolutely essential part. They are certainly subject to continual stimulations from what is going on in other parts of his body and from the contact of his

skin with the bedclothes, and to occasional stimulation from sources of sound in his neighbourhood.

I think that what is known of the facts of dreaming would strongly suggest that those parts of the brain which are involved in waking sense-perception are essential to the production of the *quasi*-sensory *materials* of our dreams. The particular materials supplied on any particular occasion would probably be determined mainly by the particular organic, tactual and auditory stimuli affecting the sleeper at the time. I should suppose that it is only the *moulding* of the materials, thus supplied, into this or that *quasi*-perceptual pattern, which depends on the sleeper's permanent memories, sentiments and desires, and on his occasional thoughts, emotions and wishes. So, even granted that a person's mind could continue to exist and to function in an unembodied state after the death of the body, and that it could carry memory-traces and a set of organized conative-emotional dispositions, it seems to me doubtful whether it would continue to be supplied with *quasi*-sensory materials for constructing *quasi*-perceptual experiences, like the dreams which it used to construct when embodied.

But of course the more fundamental question is this. Can we conceive that a mind which animated the body of a certain person, and a mind which is now altogether unembodied, could have that kind and degree of continuity with each other which is essential if the latter can be said to be the *survivor* of that person?

Professor Price rightly insists that we could not properly talk of "survival" unless the supposed unembodied mind be able to remember experiences had by the person in question before his death, and unless it be continuous in character and dispositions with that person's. But he simply assumes without discussion that this is possible. This seems to me extremely hard to believe, for various reasons. I will mention three which strongly influence me:—

(1) We know that dissociations of personality occur during the life of a single human body, as a result of injury, illness, shock, etc. Does it seem likely that there would be continuity of personality in spite of the *prima facie* much more complete chasm between embodiment and complete unembodiment? (2) Since losses of memory, profound changes of character and emotional disposition, etc., are found to follow certain injuries to the brain and certain diseases, does it not seem almost inevitable to conclude that a person's powers of remembering, character and dispositions are essentially bound up with the body which his mind animates? (3) We can form a fairly satisfactory notion of the basis of persistently organized dispositions in an *extended* substance, for we can think of it in terms of a persistent spatial structure or of types of recurrent motion. But how can we conceive it in a substance which is by hypothesis *without extension*?

I might remark that there would be no difficulty in combining the view that experiences soon after death resemble dreams rather than waking perceptions, with the view that what persists is a mind animating some kind of body. For, after all, *our* dreams are the experiences of *embodied* minds.

Lastly, I would suggest that it is more plausible to suppose that this dream-like after-death state may occupy the interval between successive embodiments in ordinary bodies, than that it is the prelude to Heaven or to Hell, in the sense in which Professor Price uses those words. To reach Heaven might be to get off the round-about once and for all, instead of being endlessly from one car to another on it.

C. D. Broad

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"——————ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

We must salute the Secretary-General of the U.N.O. for the courage, tact and patience which he showed in upholding the prestige of the Organization of which he is the official head. The death of the U.N.O. would have been announced if he had not succeeded. He has been able to hold his own against three influential members of the Organization who were among the founders of the U.N.O. Perhaps he could not have succeeded if the U.S.A. had not stood behind him and backed his plans and ideas—though even that is doubtful. Essentially, the success of Mr. Dag Hammarskjoeld is the success of the voice of the peoples of the world. From New Delhi to New York, from London to Los Angeles, the enlightened opinion of all peoples has been expressed in favour of peace and against war for any purpose. It is a stupendous step in advance for the humanity of this day to have won a victory over influential and rich states powerful enough in military equipment to terrorize small nations.

The Secretary-General has emerged a more powerful wielder of the *Vajra* than heads of national parliaments and legislatures. This is as it should be.

The primary question is not even the rights or wrongs of one or another party. The primary assertion of all civilized men was: "No war, no aggression, will be tolerated by the world at large." The defeat of the aggressors, however partial and incomplete it may seem today, contains a seed which is bound to germinate; presently we must see the effects of the Secretary-General's wonderful work.

The natural outcome of this should be the establishment of an Army of Protection at the disposal of the U.N.O. In previous years the title of "police force" has been evoked. It is a weak name, and we should now speak of the Army of Protection the U.N.O. must control, to intervene without delay, whenever the necessity arises.

Indirectly the success of Mr. Dag Hammarskjoeld is a final blow to all Marxians who believe in war and violence. Below we comment upon the work done by the Special Conference convened by the Government of India for the celebration of the 2,500th Anniversary of the Parinirvana of the Buddha. The U.N.O. must take the necessary steps to produce a clear-cut philosophy of peace, a strong recommendation and exposition of the doctrine that the greatest of all wars is against human selfishness, anger and greed. In modern times Gandhiji set an example which is gradually affecting the mind of the race, making it less violent, more peaceful. He has contributed something towards lessening the force of hate and setting free the power of love. His philosophy may seem to have affected the race-mind directly in only a small measure, but indirectly it has done so on a vast scale. The U.N.O. should take the necessary steps to focus world attention on the moral principles underlying the Army of Protection which the U.N.O. must come to command.

Much has been said about the beneficence of the political *Panchasila* brought into existence by India's Prime Minister. It demands the practice of peace, non-violence, good will and respect for other peoples and nations. Its success has been very

partial. What the U.N.O. needs to promulgate is the original *Panchasila* of the Great Master who asserted: Kill not, Steal not, Lust not, Drug not, Covet not. These five dont's have their respective positive aspects and the U.N.O. should promulgate the doctrines of Compassion, Respect for Other People's Possessions, Love for All Beings, Cleanliness of Life and Charity for All. These principles should be embodied for individual citizens of all nations to practise, and that will be the real starting point for the creation of citizens for an International, Universal World State.

The ninth session of the Unesco International Conference gave an opportunity to Prime Minister Nehru to organize a four-day symposium to celebrate the 2,500th Anniversary of the Parinirvana of Gautama the Enlightened One. The closing meeting at Vigyan Bhavan sent out a Message to our world torn by the suspicions and dissensions, the greed and selfishness, of some of "the great powers." The two Lamas who came from Tibet and others from other lands spoke of the great worth of the philosophical and moral wisdom of the Tathagata, He who followed in the footsteps of illustrious predecessors, and whose precepts and example are capable of creating his true followers, the Buddhas to be.

In the absence of Dr. Radhakrishnan, because of a bereavement, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru presided. In his opening speech he said that in spite of great advance in scientific knowledge, it had "sometimes led to disaster." Very significantly he added that

> a stage had now come when it had become of vital importance that some element which was beyond the ken of the practical politician should be found for the solution of the world's problems. The forces of evil and the forces of violence had become so tremendous that unless they were held in check, they might lead to disaster for the world.

The simple words of the *Panchatantra*, so admirably translated by Ryder, contain a profound message:—

> No wisdom lies in fighting, since
> It is the fools who fight;
> The wise discover in wise books
> What course is wise and right,
> And wise books, in the course that is
> Not violent, delight.

The very spiritual Soul of the Buddha Teachings, the foundation and basis of religion itself, the alpha and omega for the practice of the Higher Life by the individual, is:—

> In this world never is enmity appeased by hatred; enmity is ever appeased by Love. This is the Law Eternal. (*Dhammapada*, 5)

The grand and practical teachings of the Buddha are primarily addressed to and meant for the individual. They contain instruction for spiritual alchemy; their practice transmutes the hard metal of passions and violence into the pure gold which shines with its own luminosity. Not only Hindus but also men who follow other creeds will serve their religion the better for killing their own pride and anger and greed, and adopting the way of friendship with all.

Sir Mirza Ismail made a noble appeal to his co-religionists at the Mysore State Muslim Conference for overcoming the separative tendency which communalism begets:—

> It remains my firm view that the Muslims as a community should have no separate political organization. They should play their part in the political field as citizens of India along with others, but not under a separate banner.

The principles of unity and brotherliness are the test of the sincerity of any organization established for the amelioration of the living conditions of humanity. In serving humanity we serve our own nation and community. But organizations are composed of men and women, and, unless each of them becomes a brother to others, he will not succeed in elevating himself, much less help others to do likewise. It is good to be a faithful Muslim but better to be a faithful Indian, and best to be a faithful humanitarian.

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- *Use the conversion table only when you have to make an actual payment.*
- *For purposes of exact calculations you should work out the equivalents at the rate of 100 Naye Paise to one rupee or 16 annas, 64 pice or 192 pies.*

Rounding off as made in the conversion table, will be necessary, only when you have to make an actual payment; 1/2 Naya Paisa and below will be ignored and more than one half of a Naya Paisa will be treated as one Naya Paisa.

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For Easy Remembrance

1 *Rupee*	...	...	100 *Naye Paise*
8 *Annas*	...	...	50 *Naye Paise*
4 *Annas*	...	...	25 *Naye Paise*
3 *Annas*	...	...	19 *Naye Paise*
2 *Annas*	...	...	12 *Naye Paise*
1 *Anna*	...	...	6 *Naye Paise*
½ *Anna*	...	...	3 *Naye Paise*

Conversion Table

(EQUIVALENTS FOR VALUE TENDERED IN ANY SINGLE PAYMENT)

Annas	Pies	Naye Paise	Annas	Pies	Naye Paise	Annas	Pies	Naye Paise	Annas	Pies	Naye Paise
0	3	2	4	3	27	8	3	52	12	3	77
0	6	3	4	6	28	8	6	53	12	6	78
0	9	5	4	9	30	8	9	55	12	9	80
1	0	6	5	0	31	9	0	56	13	0	81
1	3	8	5	3	33	9	3	58	13	3	83
1	6	9	5	6	34	9	6	59	13	6	84
1	9	11	5	9	36	9	9	61	13	9	86
2	0	12	6	0	37	10	0	62	14	0	87
2	3	14	6	3	39	10	3	64	14	3	89
2	6	16	6	6	41	10	6	66	14	6	91
2	9	17	6	9	42	10	9	67	14	9	92
3	0	19	7	0	44	11	0	69	15	0	94
3	3	20	7	3	45	11	3	70	15	3	95
3	6	22	7	6	47	11	6	72	15	6	97
3	9	23	7	9	48	11	9	73	15	9	98
4	0	25	8	0	50	12	0	75	16	0	100

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